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A CIRCUIT SPLIT SURVEY ON VIOLENT FELONIES AND
CRIMES OF VIOLENCE: WHERE DOES THE TENTH CIRCUIT
STAND?
INTRODUCTION
Criminal recidivism was a buzzword in the media, Congress, and
the criminal justice system long before the "crime wave" of the 1980s
and the subsequent "War on Drugs." Congress began to target career
criminals after social research conducted in the 1970s and 1980s showed
a small number of "habitual offenders" were responsible for a large por-
tion of crimes.' During the mid-to-late 1980s, Congress and the Federal
Sentencing Commission took action to isolate recidivist criminals and
ensure their removal from the general public via incarceration. However,
it seems that the ambiguity in both Congress's Armed Career Criminal
Act (ACCA) 2 and the United States' Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) 3 has
largely served to increase litigation and divide the federal court system.
The ACCA increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a felon
in possession of a firearm,4 from 10 years to 15 years if the person has
three previous, separate convictions for a "violent felony" or a serious
drug offense.5 Similarly, the USSG increases a person's base offense
level depending on previous convictions for a "crime of violence."6 For
example, a person would receive a base offense level of at least 24,7 if he
or she committed the instant offense after having two or more felony
1. James G. Levine, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the US. Sentencing Guide-
lines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 537, 545 (2009).
2. Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006) (instituting mandatory prison
terms of not less than fifteen years for certain repeat offenders).
3. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2K2.1, 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (2010) (defining
offense levels for crimes related to firearms and unlawfully entering or remaining in the United
States).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006) (defining the unlawful act of felon in possession of a firearm).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
6. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1.
7. Base offense levels are points assigned to defendants based on the offense committed,
their prior criminal convictions, and specific circumstances of those crimes, i.e. whether the crimes
were committed while serving a criminal justice sentence (probation, parole, work release, etc.), id. §
4A1 1(d), or with a weapon, id. § 4B1.4. These points are designed to reflect the likelihood of re-
cidivism and future criminal behavior of defendants with prior criminal histories. Courts are to
determine the relevant offense guideline section from chapter two of the USSG based on the offense
of conviction or the offense to which the defendant stipulated. Id. § I B 1.1. The base offense level
of a crime is determined in chapter two and may be adjusted based on the criteria listed in chapter
three (e.g. adjustments related to the victim, the defendant's role in the offense, and whether the
defendant accepted responsibility). Id. chs. 2, 3, pts. A, B, E. For example, burglary of a residence
is given a base offense level of 17 in chapter two, but may be adjusted to 15 because the defendant
"clearly demonstrated acceptance of responsibility for his offense." Id. §§ 2B2.1, § 3E1.L. How-
ever, criminal history of crime of violence may increase the base level according to sections 2K2.1
and 4A1.l.
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convictions for a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.8
Predictably, the issues that are most often litigated when dealing with the
ACCA, the USSG, or both are the definition and scope of "violent fel-
ony" and "crime of violence."
In the Tenth Circuit alone, between September 1, 2009 and August
31, 2010, there were six cases addressing the application of the recidi-
vism sentencing enhancements of the ACCA and the USSG. 9 Other cir-
cuits faced many of the same legal issues and published their own opin-
ions, sometimes in harmony with the Tenth Circuit, and other times
promulgating a different interpretation of the USSG or ACCA, creating a
circuit split.10 Furthermore, cases in all circuits have relied upon various
precedents in their opinions, exhibiting a rich body of USSG and ACCA
law.
This Comment surveys recent Tenth Circuit ACCA and USSG case
law during the period of September 2009 through August 2010, and
highlights some of the critical questions dividing the circuits. First, this
Comment provides background on the ACCA and USSG. Next, it gives
an overview of the law common to ACCA and USSG interpretations and
briefs the relevant cases in recent Tenth Circuit jurisprudence. The third
section discusses recent circuit splits regarding the characterization of
convictions for fleeing a police officer and the definition of "burglary of
a dwelling." And finally, this Comment analyzes the controversy of us-
ing juvenile adjudications as predicate offenses under the ACCA and
predicts how the Tenth Circuit may rule on the issue.
I. THE STATUTES
A. The Armed Career Criminal Act: Violent Felonies
Passed in 1984, the ACCA is just one federal law aimed at recidi-
vists. t' The text of the ACCA provides:
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title [by
being a felon in possession of a firearm] and has three previous con-
victions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both,
8. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(2).
9. United States v. Silva, 608 F.3d 663 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. McConnell, 605
F.3d 822 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Martinez, 602 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2010); United States
v. Wise, 597 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Darton, 595 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2009).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Tyler, 580 F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 2010) (declining to interpret
a violation of fleeing a peace officer statute as a "crime of violence" under the USSG in contrast to
Wise and McConnell); United States v. Wenner, 351 F.3d 969, 972-73 (9th Cir. 2003) (interpreting
the enumerated felony of "burglary of a dwelling" under the USSG in contrast to Rivera-Oros).
]1. United States v. Strahl, 958 F.2d 980, 985 (10th Cir. 1992); H.R. REP. No. 98-1159, at 4
(1984) (Conf. Rep.); see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (2006) (federal "Three Strikes Law").
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committed on occasions different from one another, such person shall
be fined ... and imprisoned not less than fifteen years ... .12
The statute defines "serious drug offense," "violent felony," and
"conviction," in subsections (2)(A) through (C), respectively 3 :
(B) the term "violent felony" means any crime punishable by impris-
onment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delin-
quency involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destruc-
tive device that would be punishable by imprisonment of such term if
committed by an adult, that-
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another; and
(C) the term "conviction" includes a finding that a person has com-
mitted an act of juvenile delinquency involving a violent felony.14
The phrase, "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious po-
tential risk of physical injury to another," is referred to as the "residual
provision" of the ACCA15 and it is the source of frequent litigation, and
the topic of several Supreme Court opinions.16
In Taylor v. United States,'7 the Supreme Court defined the generic
definition of "burglary" under the ACCA as an "unlawful or unprivileged
entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit
a crime."1 When a state statute defines burglary more broadly than this
generic definition, a court can look to the charging document and other
records to determine if the necessary Taylor elements were satisfied.' 9
B. United States Sentencing Guidelines: Crimes of Violence
Three years after the passage of the ACCA, federal sentencing
guidelines created a structure for increasing base offense levels20 accord-
12. Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006).
13. § 924(e)(2)(A)-(C).
14. § 924(e)(2)(B)-(C).
15. E.g., United States v. Martinez, 602 F.3d 1166, 1168-69 (10th Cir. 2010).
16. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010); Chambers v. United States, 129 S.
Ct. 687 (2009); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192
(2007); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
17. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
18. Id. at 599.
19. Id. at 602.
20. The Introductory Commentary to chapter four of the USSG states that a defendant with
prior criminal history is more culpable than a first time offender, and as such, deserves greater pun-
ishment. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2010). In addition,
base offense levels can be increased or decreased based on the adjustment categories enumerated in
chapter three and within individual offense guidelines in chapter two. Id. ch. 3; see, e.g.,id § 2Al.2.
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ing to previous convictions for "crimes of violence" or a "controlled sub-
stance offense." 21 The Application Notes for the USSG cross-reference
section 4B1.2(a) for the definition of a crime of violence. Section
4B1.2(a) is strikingly similar to the ACCA definition of crime of vio-
lence, and in fact, the biggest difference is the ACCA's enumerated fel-
ony of "burglary," versus "burglary of a dwelling" in the USSG.22 The
definition reads:
The term "crime of violence" means any offense under federal or
state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,
that-
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another, or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of ex-
plosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious poten-
tial risk of physical injury to another.23
Similar to the ACCA, the "otherwise involves" phrase of the USSG
is referred to as the residual clause.24 As to convictions, the USSG disal-
25lows juvenile adjudications as predicate offenses. A crime committed
by a person under eighteen does not qualify as a predicate offense unless
"it is classified as an adult conviction under the laws of the jurisdiction in
which the defendant was convicted." 2 6
A key issue of contention among the circuits is whether the ACCA
enumerated offense of "burglary" and the USSG enumerated offense of
"burglary of a dwelling" are limited to immutable, physical structures.
Taylor's general definition of "burglary" is specifically limited to "build-
21. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1.
22. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 4B 1.2(a). Interestingly, the USSG also provides for increasing base offense levels if the defendant
had been deported after "a conviction for a felony that is (i) a drug trafficking offense for which the
sentence imposed exceeded 13 months; (ii) a crime of violence; (iii) a firearms offense; [or] (iv) a
child pomography offense." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2L1.2(b)(1)(A). Not only
does the deportation section provide more enumerated offenses for a level increase, but it also lists
twelve enumerated offenses that constitute a crime of violence, as opposed to the four for persons
who are not subject to deportation. § 2Ll.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii) (enumerated crimes are: murder, man-
slaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses (including where consent to the
conduct is not given or is not legally valid, such as where consent to the conduct is involuntary,
incompetent, or coerced), statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor, robbery, arson, extortion, extor-
tionate extension of credit, burglary of a dwelling). This difference is at issue in the Tenth Circuit
case of United States v. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2009).
23. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4Bl.2(a).
24. E.g., United States v. Wise, 597 F.3d 1141, 1144 (10th Cir. 2010).
25. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1 cmt. n.1. A predicate offense in the
context of a discussion about the ACCA and USSG is a prior conviction that qualifies as a "violent
felony" or "crime of violence" and thus produces a sentencing enhancement under the Act or the
Guidelines, or both.
26. Id. Thus, in the state of Colorado, a juvenile convicted of a crime in adult criminal court
under the direct file statute, COLD. REV. STAT. § 19-2-517 (2010), would likely be subject to future
sentencing enhancements under the USSG.
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ing[s] or structure[s],"2  and specifies that state statutes including auto-
mobiles, vending machines, and tents as structures are too broad.28 In
interpreting "burglary of a dwelling," the Tenth Circuit holds that con-
duct constituting such a crime is a subtype of burglary, and therefore,
requires a separate general definition. 29 The Tenth Circuit does not limit
the Taylor definition to buildings or structures used as dwellings, but
defines "burglary of a dwelling" as burglary of "any enclosed space that
is used or intended for use as a human habitation." 30 The Ninth Circuit
disagrees and applies the Taylor definition, limiting the definition of
dwelling to buildings and structures not including automobiles, vending
machines, and tents.3 ' The Ninth Circuit concludes that Washington resi-
dential burglary is beyond the scope of a "crime of violence" because the
statutory definition of "dwelling" includes places that are not struc-
tures.32
II. THE CASE LAW
When interpreting crimes of violence and violent felonies, the cir-
cuit courts deal with several preliminary issues that are noted here to
provide background for discussion of the following opinions. First,
whether a prior offense is a crime of violence or a violent felony is a
question of law that is reviewed de novo by the appellate circuits. 33
Second, because of the similar language in the definitions of "crime
of violence" and "violent felony," the Tenth Circuit and other courts
generally look to their own precedent for categorizing a crime as a vio-
lent felony under the ACCA when dealing with the same crime under the
USSG, and vice versa.34
Finally, when deciding whether a conviction for an enumerated fel-
ony in a given state is a conviction for the offense as intended by Con-
gress or the Sentencing Commission, courts typically use a categorical
27. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990).
28. See id. at 602.
29. United States v. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d 1123, 1129 (10th Cir. 2009).
30. Id. at 1132 (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. See United States v. Wenner, 351 F.3d 969, 972 (9th Cir. 2003).
32. Id. at 972-73.
33. E.g., United States v. McConnell, 605 F.3d 822, 824 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Martinez, 602 F.3d 1166, 1168 (10th Cir. 2010); Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1125.
34. E.g., Martinez, 602 F.3d at 1173 ("This language is very similar to the ACCA language
defining the term violent felony. And we have looked to interpretations of the ACCA to guide our
reading of § 4B1.2(a)."); United States v. Wise, 597 F.3d 1141, 1145 (10th Cir. 2010) ("The residual
clause of the ACCA is worded almost identically to that of § 4B1.2(a), and we have held that in
interpreting 'crime of violence' under § 4B13.2, we may look for guidance to cases construing the
ACCA's parallel provision."); United States v. Tyler, 580 F.3d 722, 724 n.3 (8th Cir. 2009) ("Al-
though the Gordon court was analyzing whether an offense constituted a 'violent felony' under the
Armed Career Criminal Act, we employ the same test to decide whether and offense constitutes a
'crime of violence' under the Sentencing Guidelines because the definitions of 'violent felony' and
'crime of violence' are virtually identical.").
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approach to analyze the state's criminal statute. 3 5 This categorical ap-
proach requires that courts look at the text of the statute to make its de-
termination and not consider the underlying facts of the defendant's
case.36 However, in instances where the offense could have been com-
mitted in a number of ways or where the offense includes both conduct
that falls under the ACCA or USSG and conduct that does not, courts
will look to the charging documents, plea agreements, and other court
records to see with what specific crime the defendant was charged.3 7
Courts do not consider the specific conduct of the defendant in this modi-
fied approach, but rather, consider the record to determine with which
subsection of the statute the defendant was charged, and thus, which sub-
section the court should examine on its face.38 This paradigm is called
the modified categorical approach.39
A. Tenth Circuit Survey
The cases discussed below are seven of the most recent Tenth Cir-
cuit cases regarding the application of the ACCA and the USSG.
1. United States v. Strah1o
In 1988, Mr. Strahl pled guilty to possession of firearms after being
convicted of a felony. Accordingly, the court then considered his 1968
California conviction for burglary, his 1975 Utah conviction for at-
tempted burglary, and his 1979 Utah conviction for burglary as predicate
offenses and increased his sentence from 5 years to 15 years, as required
under the ACCA at the time.4 1 The defendant appealed his enhanced
sentence, arguing that California's definition of burglary is outside the
generic definition of burglary, and attempted burglary is not a predicate
offense under the ACCA.42
35. E.g., Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1127.
36. Id. ("To determine whether a previous conviction satisfies the generic meaning of the
offense, ordinarily we apply 'a formal categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definitions
of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions."' (quoting Taylor
v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990))). This categorical approach is similar to the approach
taken by courts in deciding if a felony was "inherently dangerous" under the Felony Murder Rule. In
cases where the Felony Murder Rule has been applied to a defendant who did not commit one of the
enumerated felonies (burglary, arson, robbery, rape, or kidnapping), the court views the felony
statute in the abstract (language only) and does not consider the underlying facts of the case at hand.
If the felony could be completed in a safe manner, then, similar to when a crime falls outside of a
generic definition of an enumerated offense, the Felony Murder Rule (or the ACCA or USSG), does
not apply. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 526-27 (5th ed. 2009).
37. Eg., Wise, 597 F.3d at 1144 (The modified approach "look[s] to the statutory elements,
the defendant's charging documents, plea agreement and colloquy (if any), and uncontested facts
found by the district judge to determine whether the particular defendant's conduct violated the
portion of the statute that is a crime of violence").
38. McConnell, 605 F.3d at 825.
39. Id; see also Wise, 597 F.3d at 1144.
40. 958 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992).
41. Id. at 982. At the time Mr. Strahl pled guilty to a felon in possession of a firearm charge,
the sentence was five years imprisonment. Id.
42. Strahl, 958 F.2d at 982-83.
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The Strahl court found that the district court erred in considering
both the California and Utah convictions. 4 3 The court found the Califor-
nia conviction not to be a "violent felony" because the California defini-
tion of burglary is outside the generic definition of burglary given by the
Supreme Court." In Taylor, the Supreme Court defined burglary under
the ACCA as an "unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a
building or structure, with intent to commit a crime."45
Furthermore, when a state defines burglary more broadly by elimi-
nating the requirement of unlawful entry or including automobiles and
vending machines as structures, the court may look to jury instructions
and indictment information to determine if the necessary elements of
burglary were charged.4 6 The Strahl court references California case law
to show that its definition of burglary is a non-generic definition because
it does not require unlawful entry and it includes places other than build-
47
ings and structures. Moreover, in reviewing the charging document as
per a modified categorical approach, the court found that Strahl's entry
into a store with intent to commit a felony or theft did not satisfy the
Taylor definition because he was not charged with unlawful entry of the
store.48 Therefore, because Strahl's conduct did not fall within the Taylor
definition of burglary, his prior conviction did not constitute a predicate
offense.
As to the issue of attempt, the Tenth Circuit decided that the defen-
dant's attempted burglary conviction was not a predicate offense because
Utah's definition of attempt includes attenuated conduct that does not
present a "serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 49 After
reviewing the legislative history of the ACCA, the court found that Con-
gress included burglary as an enumerated offense primarily because it is
a crime that is perpetrated by many repeat offenders and because it poses
the serious risk of violent confrontation with investigating officers or
occupants of the building.o The court noted that a defendant in Utah
could be convicted of attempted burglary based on duplicating a key,
surveilling the targeted building, or obtaining floor plans, none of which
create a "high risk of violent confrontation inherent in a completed bur-
glary."51 Thus, a conviction for attempted burglary under the Utah statute
52is not a predicate offense under the ACCA's residual clause.
43. Id. at 984, 986.
44. Id. at 983-84.
45. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990).
46. See Strahl, 958 F.2d at 983-84 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602). This is an example of a
modified categorical approach.
47. Strahl, 958 F.2d at 983.
48. Id at 984.
49. Id. at 986.
50. Id. at 985.
51. Id. at 986.
52. Id.
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2. United States v. Permenter,53 United States v. Fell,54 & United
States v. Martinez
The Permenter court used the Strahl analysis to reverse an en-
hanced ACCA sentence based on an Oklahoma attempted burglary
charge.56 The court found that because the Oklahoma attempt statute
provided that "any act" directed toward the completion of the substantive
offense constituted attempt, it was not a violent felony.5 7 The court rea-
soned that a defendant's conduct would not pose a serious potential risk
to others.
The Tenth Circuit reconsidered its inchoate offense analysis in Fell
and Martinez in light of the Supreme Court decision in James v. United
States.59 Contrary to the other cases in this section, James found at-
tempted burglary to be a violent felony because Florida case law had
limited the definition of attempted burglary to a significant step toward
entry of a building or structure.60 This narrowed definition reflected the
main risk of burglary: violent confrontation with the building's occu-
pants or law enforcement.61
In its opinion, the James Court held that courts should only look at
the elements of the predicate inchoate offense to determine whether it
presents a serious potential risk of injury to another, not at the elements
of the underlying substantive offense.62 The Tenth Circuit in Fell stated
that, by holding that only elements of the inchoate crimes should be con-
sidered, James rejected the Circuit's approach in Strahl and Permenter.63
The Tenth Circuit first applied the James methodology in Fell. The
Fell court determined that conspiracy to commit second-degree burglary
in Colorado is not a violent felony under the ACCA because-in analyz-
ing the statutory elements of conspiracy rather than second-degree bur-
glary-the court held that, in Colorado, conspiracy does not require an
act directed toward entry of a building, and therefore, there is no poten-
tial risk of serious injury to another.64
53. 969 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1992).
54. 511 F.3d 1035 (10th Cir. 2007).
55. 602 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2010).
56. Permenter, 969 F.2d at 915.
57. Id. at 913.
58. Id.
59. 550 U.S. 192, 202-09 (2007) (finding Florida attempted burglary a violent felony under
the ACCA because Florida law defined attempted burglary as a significant step towards entry of the
building or structure, and therefore did not criminalize attenuated conduct. The Florida definition
also reflected the main risk of burglary-violent confrontation).
60. Id. at 202, 209.
61. Id. at 203.
62. Id. at 208.
63. Fell, 511 F.3d at 1039-40.
64. Id. at 1041-43.
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When the inchoate issue was again considered in Martinez, the
Tenth Circuit-employing the reasoning in James-focused on the par-
ties' arguments as to whether Arizona law had limited the definition of
attempted burglary to a significant step towards entry into a building as
the Florida courts had done in James.65 The Tenth Circuit was not per-
suaded in Martinez that Arizona attempt law was narrowed to exclude
preparatory conduct; the Tenth Circuit found that the Arizona Supreme
Court has never used the "substantial step test," and even if that test had
been adopted, a substantial step towards the completion of a burglary can
still include the attenuated conduct unaddressed by the James court and
66at issue in the Strahl progeny.
In line with the cases proceeding from Strahl, the Tenth Circuit
found that "[i]f one can commit the offense of attempted burglary in
many ways without an act directed toward entry of the building, the risk
of physical injury to another is too speculative to satisfy the residual pro-
vision of [the ACCA]."6 7 Once again, only looking at the elements of the
inchoate offense, the Circuit concludes that Arizona has not similarly
limited its attempted burglary definition because, like Strahl and Per-
menter, attenuated conduct such as "casing" a building qualifies as an
attempted burglary. 68 Thus, Martinez's Arizona attempt conviction was
not a predicate offense under the ACCA.
Martinez, however, had a second holding. On the basis of his Ari-
zona attempted burglary conviction, the defendant challenged both his
sentencing enhancement under the ACCA and his increased base offense
level under the USSG.70 In a split holding, the Tenth Circuit held that
while attempted burglary was not a violent felony in Arizona, it is a
crime of violence under the USSG.7' To interpret Sentencing Guideline
language, the court looked to the Sentencing Commission's commentary,
which "is binding and authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or
a federal statute, or is inconsistent with . .. that guideline."72
The commentary to section 4B1.2-the section defining crimes of
violence-states that crimes of violence include their inchoate counter-
parts. 7 3 The court goes further to hypothesize that the Sentencing Com-
mission included inchoate offenses because of empirical evidence show-
ing that attempt crimes often pose a similar risk of injury as completed
65. United States v. Martinez, 602 F.3d 1166, 1170-71 (10th Cir. 2010).
66. Id. at 1172.
67. Id.at1170.
68. Id. at 1172-73.
69. Id. at 1173.
70. Id.at1168.
71. Id.at1173,1175.
72. Id. at 1173-74.
73. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2 cmt n.. (2010) ("'Crime of violence'
... include[s] the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such of-
fenses.").
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offenses.74 Therefore, the court found that it "cannot invalidate an appli-
cation note merely because our view of empirical data differs from that
of the Sentencing Commission" and found that attempted burglary was a
crime of violence under the USSG.75
3. United States v. Rivera-Oros76
In Rivera-Oros, the Tenth Circuit addressed the enumerated felony
of "burglary of a dwelling" under the USSG definition of crime of vio-
lence.77 The defendant was convicted of second-degree burglary in Ari-
zona, which is defined as "entering or remaining unlawfully in or on a
residential structure with the intent to commit any theft or any felony
therein."78 Mr. Rivera-Oros unlawfully entered the home of his girl-
friend's mother and was found on the premises by police; the mother told
police that jewelry was missing from her home.79 On appeal, he chal-
lenged the sentencing enhancement for this conviction on the basis that it
was improperly characterized as "burglary of a dwelling" under USSG
section 2Ll.2(b).so
Unlike Strahl, the Rivera-Oros court did not use the Taylor defini-
tion of generic burglary because Taylor addressed the enumerated felony
of "burglary" under the ACCA, and the definition at issue here was
"burglary of a dwelling" under the USSG. 8'
While the courts generally use precedent analyzing the ACCA to in-
form decisions regarding interpretation of the USSG,82 and vice versa,
the Tenth Circuit explicitly refused to do so in Rivera-Oros because the
ACCA enumerates "burglary" while the USSG enumerates "burglary of
a dwelling"; in deciding if a previous conviction is a crime of violence,
the generic meaning of "burglary of a dwelling" must be used, not "bur-
74. Martinez, 602 F.3d at 1174-75 (quoting James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 206
(2007)).
75. Martinez, 602 F.3d at 1175. It is this kind of disparate result that leads some authors to
conclude that reforms are desperately needed in the ACCA. Levine, supra note 1, at 548-66. Levine
argues that because the aims of the both the ACCA and USSG are similar, in fact, almost identical,
the ACCA should be reformed to reflect certain aspects of the USSG. Id at 549-50. He puts forth
that the ACCA has not been amended in over twenty years while the USSG is frequently amended to
take into account trends in recidivism and the motivation and controls of criminal behavior. Id. at
550. Levine specifically advocates for the ACCA to conform to the USSG in temporal qualities (i.e.
if there is more than fifteen years separating the instant offense and a prior felony conviction that
conviction should not count as a predicate offense, and juvenile offenses should not count as predi-
cate offenses) and the scope of predicate offenses (i.e. change "burglary" to "burglary of a dwelling"
and escape qualifies only if the conduct expressly charged, by its nature, presented a potential seri-
ous risk of physical injury). Id. at 551-66. Interestingly, these changes could eliminate the circuit
splits outlined in this article.
76. 590 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2009).
77. Id. at 1126.
78. Id. at 1133 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1507(A) (2010)).
79. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1125 n. 1.
80. Id. at 1124-25.
81. Id.at1l28.
82. See United States v. McConnell, 605 F.3d 822, 825 (10th Cir. 2010); see also United
States v. Wise, 597 F.3d 1141, 1144 (10th Cir. 2010).
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glary." Furthermore, the court noted that the defendant was sentenced
under section 2L1.2(b), which defines crime of violence differently than
the ACCA because of the deportation element. 84
To form the generic definition of burglary of a dwelling, the court
looked to legislative history and the Sentencing Commission's height-
ened concern for the physical and psychological harms associated with
residential burglaries; the historical recognition of those harms date back
to Blackstone, and the common understanding of the word "dwelling."8 s
The court defined dwelling under section 2L1.2 as "any 'enclosed space
that is used or intended for use as a human habitation,"' 86 and noted that
its conclusion is in line with the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Murillo-
Lopez.87
The court next considered whether, using the categorical approach,
the statute under which the defendant was convicted corresponded to the
generic definition. To find that a state statute criminalizes activity out-
side the generic definition of an enumerated offense "requires a realistic
probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the state would apply its
statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime."89
Arizona case law considers the character and use of a structure in deter-
mining if it is a dwelling.90 Under this analysis, a gift shop in a hotel does
not qualify as a dwelling, but a guest room in that same hotel would, in
fact, qualify. 9' Thus, the term "residential structure" in the statute in
question substantially conformed to the generic definition of dwelling
and the Rivera-Oros court affirmed the defendant's enhanced sentence. 92
4. United States v. Wise 93 & United States v. McConnell 4
Wise and McConnell are concerned with the characterization of
failure to stop for, or fleeing from a police officer as a crime of violence
under the residual clause of USSG section 4Bl.2(a). Both cases were
decided within the past year and both considered the characterization in
light of the Supreme Court's holding in Chambers v. United States96 that
escape crimes are not categorically violent felonies under the ACCA,97
83. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1128-29.
84. Id. at 1129 n.5; see supra text accompanying note 21.
85. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1132.
86. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 582 (9th ed. 2009)).
87. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1132 (citing United States v. Murillo-Lopez, 444 F.3d 337 (5th
Cir. 2006)).
88. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1126-27.
89. Id. at 1133 (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)).
90. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1133-34.
91. Id.at1133.
92. Id.at1134.
93. 597 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2010).
94. 605 F.3d 822 (10th Cir. 2010).
95. Id. at 823; Wise, 597 F.3d at 1142.
96. 129 S. Ct. 687 (2009).
97. Id. at 692-93.
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holding contrary to Tenth Circuit precedent. 98 Furthermore, both Wise
and McConnell use the test promulgated by the Supreme Court in Begay
v. United States,9 9 which declared DUls are not predicate offenses' 00 to
determine whether fleeing falls into the residual clause of USSG section
4B1.2(a).o'0 The only differences in analysis for these two cases are the
text of the state statutes in question: Utah in Wise and Kansas in McCon-
nell.102
The Tenth Circuit Court begins its analysis in Wise and McConnell
by applying the modified categorical approachl 0 3 to the fleeing statutes to
determine if they qualify as a crime of violence.104 In Begay, the Su-
preme Court elaborated upon the method of determining if an offense is a
crime of violence under the residual clauses. The Begay test requires not
only that the offense present a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another, but it must also be "roughly similar, in kind as well as degree of
risk posed" to the enumerated offenses. 05 A crime is "roughly similar" to
an enumerated offense if it "typically involve[s] purposeful, 'violent,'
and 'aggressive' conduct."' 06
The next step the Wise and McConnell courts took in their analysis
was to recount prior Tenth Circuit fleeing precedent.107 In United States
v. West'08-where a defendant fled a traffic stop and accelerated through
city streets, disregarding traffic signals and ultimately losing control of
his vehicle-the Tenth Circuit applied the Begay test to the Utah fleeing
statute, and found that both subsections constitute a violent felony under
the ACCA.09 The court analogized the conduct of fleeing to an escape
offense because both involve conduct that greatly increases the risk of
violent confrontation with law enforcement and third parties." 0 The Utah
fleeing statute at issue in West was the same as the statute at issue in
Wise, and defines failure to stop at a signal of a police officer as "op-
erat[ing] the vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to
interfere with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person; or at-
98. McConnell, 605 F.3d at 828; Wise, 597 F.3d at 1145.
99. 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
100. Id. at 148.
101. McConnell, 605 F.3d at 826-27; Wise, 597 F.3d at 1144-45.
102. McConnell, 605 F.3d at 825-26; Wise, 597 F.3d at 1143-44.
103. The modified approach was used in these cases because both statutes at issue had multiple
subsections that could present different "potential risk[s] of physical injury to another," U.S. SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4Bl.2(a) (2010), and therefore the courts must determine with
which subsection the defendants were charged, McConnell, 605 F.3d at 824-29; Wise, 597 F.3d at
1143-47.
104. McConnell, 605 F.3d at 825-26; Wise, 597 F.3d at 144.
105. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 143 (2008).
106. Id. at 143-45.
107. McConnell, 605 F.3d at 827-30 (discussing United States v. West, 550 F.3d 952 (10th
Cir. 2008)); Wise, 597 F.3d at 1145-48 (also discussing the West opinion).
108. 550 F.3d 952 (10th Cir. 2008).
109. Id. at 960-65.
110. Id. at 964-65.
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tempt to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or other means."' 1 The
question Wise posed was: Is West good law after the Supreme Court held
that not all escape crimes are violent felonies?ll 2 In other words, does
Chambers implicitly overrule West's reliance on the Tenth Circuit prece-
dent that categorically defined escape as a violent crime under the USSG
and ACCA?i 3 In response to these questions, both Wise and McConnell
determined that West remains good law because the Supreme Court's
holding in Chambers is narrow, pertaining only to escape crimes involv-
ing inaction and no danger to third parties.' 14
Because the Utah statute requires deliberate action by the defendant
(willful or wanton disregard), the violation must necessarily be commit-
ted in the presence of a police officer (fleeing or eluding a police officer),
the violation is likely to endanger third parties, and the violation poses a
threat of direct confrontation between the police officer and the defen-
dant(s), there is an increased risk of serious potential injury." 5
Similarly, the Kansas stautory subsection under which McConnell
was charged requires the conduct to be willful and occur in the presence
of a police officer." 6 In addition, McConnell's conviction included the
element of a car accident or damage to property, a further risk of serious
physical injury.117 The McConnell court also notes that there is a circuit
split on this issue, but the Tenth Circuit's findings are in accord with the
majority of circuits. 8
5. United States v. Silva"9
The Silva case dealt with two separate crimes and their classifica-
tion as a violent felony under the ACCA. The Tenth Circuit first ad-
dressed whether burglary of a shed under New Mexico law is a violent
felony.120 Second, the court turned to whether apprehension causing ag-
gravated assault under New Mexico law is a violent felony.121
Ill. Id. at 961.
112. Chambers v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 687, 689 (2009).
113. United States v. McConnell, 605 F.3d 822, 828 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
Springfield, 196 F.3d 1180, 1185 (10th Cir. 1999), for the proposition that all escape crimes are
violent crimes under the ACCA and USSG).
114. McConnell, 605 F.3d at 829; United States v. Wise, 597 F.3d 1141, 1146 (10th Cir. 2010).
115. Wise, 597 F.3d at 1146-47.
116. McConnell, 605 F.3d at 828-29. McConnell's charging document stated that he willfully
failed to bring his vehicle to a stop at a police officer's command and while fleeing, he was involved
in a motor vehicle accident or intentionally caused damage to property. Id. at 826.
117. Id. at 829.
118. Id. at 830 (the Tenth Circuit is in accord with the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, but is
in disagreement with the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits).
119. 608 F.3d 663 (10th Cir. 2010).
120. Id. at 665-69.
121. Id. at 669-75.
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a. Burglary of "a Structure, a Shed"l 22
In its analysis, the Silva court employed a modified categorical ap-
proach because New Mexico's statute-as compared to the Taylor defi-
nition of burglary l-provides for a non-generic definition of bur-
glary.124 The defendant argued that the shed he burgled did not meet the
"building or other structure" element of the Taylor definition.12 5 Using
precedent from the Ninth Circuit, Silva argued that "building or struc-
ture" means only those spaces that are permanent and designed for hu-
man habitation or business.' 26
The Tenth Circuit rejected Silva's structural permanency argument
by finding fault with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and using Supreme
Court precedent to find a broader definition of "building or other struc-
ture" as used in Taylor.12 7 Since the Taylor decision, the United States
Supreme Court has found that the "building or other structure" compo-
nent is broader than the Ninth Circuit's requirement of permanency. 128
Shepard v. United States,'29 the Court found that the ACCA makes bur-
glary a violent felony only if committed in a building or enclosed
space.130 In Silva, the Tenth Circuit found the Ninth Circuit's analysis,
and the defendant's arguments incomplete because they did not discuss
Shepard.' 3 ' Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit's own precedent in Rivera-
Oros and United States v. Cummingsl32 rejected such a narrow reading of
"building or other structure" and declined the Ninth Circuit's invitation
to find the "or other structure" phrase superfluous.133 Therefore, the court
concluded that the defendant's guilty plea to burglary of "a structure, a
shed" under New Mexico law was a violent felony.134
122. Id. at 666.
123. "[A]n unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure,
with intent to commit a crime." Id. at 667 (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598
(1990)).
124. Silva, 608 F.3d at 665-66.
125. Id. at 666.
126. Id. The court notes that the defendant presented evidence that the shed had been moved to
various points in the victim's yard. Id. at 679.
127. Id. at 668.
128. Compare Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 15-16 (2005), with United States v.
Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) ("[A] structure designed for occupancy that is
intended for use in one place.").
129. 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
130. Id at 15-16.
131. Silva, 608 F.3d at 668.
132. 531 F.3d 1232, 1235 (10th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's holding that found the
phrase "or other structure" superfluous because the generic definition of burglary broadly construes
the settings for burglary and does not include only buildings).
133. These cases interpret Grisel as finding the "or other structure" clause of the Taylor defini-
tion superfluous. United States v. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d 1123, 1128 n.4 (10th Cir. 2009); Cum-
mings, 531 F.3d at 1235.
134. Silva, 608 F.3d at 669.
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b. Apprehension Causing Assault
The second charge used for Silva's ACCA mandatory minimum
sentence was a conviction for aggravated assault; the district court de-
termined that this conviction had "as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." 3 5
Once again, the Tenth Circuit employed a categorical approach, looking
only to the statutory text.
Recently, in Johnson v. United States,136 the Supreme Court found
that "physical force" under the ACCA means "violent force-that is,
force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person."' 37
Under New Mexico statute, assault is defined as "any unlawful act, threat
or menacing conduct which causes another person to reasonably believe
that he is in danger of receiving an immediate battery."' 3 8 Aggravated
assault adds the element of a deadly weapon.13 9
The mens rea for aggravated assault is general criminal intent,
which the New Mexico Supreme Court has defined as "conscious
wrongdoing or purposeful doing of an act the law declares to be a
crime." 40 Thus, the Tenth Circuit framed the issue before them as
"whether 'apprehension causing' aggravated assault-which requires
proof that a defendant purposefully threatened or engaged in menacing
conduct toward a victim, with a weapon 'capable of producing death or
great bodily harm'-is a violent felony under the ACCA."l 41
The defendant argued that because apprehension causing aggravated
assault "does not require proof of 'any intent with respect to the per-
ceived threat [the defendant] has raised in the mind of the victim,' . . . [it]
'does not have as an element the intentional use, attempted use or threat-
ened use of physical force."'l 42 The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument
because the defendant's plea of aggravated assault meant that he pled to
a general intent crime whereby he consciously or purposefully commit-
ted an illegal act.143 In contrast to the dissent, the majority argued that
apprehension causing aggravated assault required more than a "display
of dexterity in handling a weapon; [rather] the crime requires proof that a
defendant purposefully threatened or engaged in menacing conduct [with
a deadly weapon] toward a victim."'"
135. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (2006)).
136. 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010).
137. Id.at1271.
138. Silva, 608 F.3d at 669 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-1 (2006)).
139. Silva, 608 F.3d at 669 (quoting § 30-3-2(A)).
140. Silva, 608 F.3d at 670 (quoting State v. Campos, 921 P.2d 1266, 1277 n.5 (N.M. 1996)).
141. Silva, 608 F.3d at 670.
142. Id. at 672 (quoting United States v. Zuniga-Soto, 527 F.3d 1110, 1124 (10th Cir. 2008))
(first alteration in original).
143. Id. at 673.
144. Id. at 674.
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c. Dissent in Silva
The dissent concurred with the majority as to the defendant's bur-
glary charge, but disagreed with the majority's reasoning regarding the
apprehension causing assault.14 5 Judge Hartz's interpretation of New
Mexico law was that one can be guilty of assault "if one causes the vic-
tim to reasonably believe that he or she is about to be battered, even if
one does not intend to create that belief."l 4 6 The dissent's example was a
person who purposefully shows his dexterity with a weapon without the
intention of causing fear or apprehension to any bystanders. 147
This perspective is contrary to Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit
precedents that hold an offense does not have as "an element the threat-
ened use of physical force against the person of another" unless it also
has as an element that the offender intend that the victim feel threat-
ened.148 Judge Hartz reasoned that the intent that is important is the intent
to use force; one does not accidentally use physical force against some-
thing.149
Furthermore, Judge Hartz argued that Tenth Circuit precedent states
that mere recklessness does not satisfy the physical force requirement. In
United States v. Zuniga-Soto,15 0 the Tenth Circuit held that because the
defendant could have been convicted of recklessly assaulting a public
servant, the use of physical force was not an element of the crime.
Carrying this precedent to the next logical step, Judge Hartz's dissent
concluded that the threatened use of physical force requires an inten-
tional threat just as the use of physical force requires the intentional use
of force.15 2 Thus, because Silva could have been convicted of aggravated
assault without the element of an intentional threat, the dissent concluded
that his conviction is not a violent felony under the ACCA, and therefore,
the mandatory minimum sentence required by that Act does not apply. 53
145. Id. (Hartz, J., dissenting).
146. Id at 675.
147. Id
148. Id.
149. Id (citing Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004)).
150. 527 F.3d 1110 (10th Cir. 2008).
151. Id.at1125.
152. Silva, 608 F.3d at 676 (Hartz, J., dissenting).
153. Idat674,679.
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B. Circuit Splits
The below section builds upon the previous case briefs and de-
scribes the current legal splits among the circuits regarding crimes of
violence and violent felonies.
1. Burglary of a Dwelling
Currently, the circuits are split regarding the application of the Tay-
lor definition of generic burglary under the ACCA to the enumerated
offense of "burglary of a dwelling" under the USSG.
a. United States v. Wennerl54 vs. Rivera-Oros
As explained above, much of the Rivera-Oros opinion turned on the
court's reasoning that although the Taylor definition of generic burglary
under the ACCA is useful, it is not controlling when defining the USSG
enumerated felony of "burglary of a dwelling."155 The Tenth Circuit
made a careful note that while their analysis aligns with an earlier Fifth
Circuit case, 15 its approach is the exact opposite of the one taken by the
Ninth Circuit in 2003.'15
In the Ninth Circuit Wenner case, Mr. Wenner was convicted under
the Washington residential burglary statute, which is defined as "'en-
ter[ing] or remain[ing] unlawfully in a dwelling other than a vehicle'
with the intent to commit a crime."' 5 8 Similar to Mr. Rivera-Oros, Mr.
Wenner's charging document stated that he "enter[ed] or remain[ed]
unlawfully in a dwelling other than a vehicle, the residence of Mike
Jewell."l 59 In contrast with the Tenth Circuit, the Wenner court reasoned
that the Taylor definition of "burglary" informs the definition of "bur-
glary of a dwelling" under the USSG.160 "Thus, the most logical and sen-
sible reading of the Guidelines and the reading that is consistent with our
cases is to construe 'burglary of a dwelling' as the Taylor definition of
burglary, with the narrowing qualification that the burglary occur in a
dwelling."l61
The court then considered the face of the Washington statute defin-
ing "dwelling" and concluded that because the definition includes a
fenced area, a railroad car, or a cargo container, it is broader than Taylor,
154. 351 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2003).
155. United States v. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d 123, 1128 (10th Cir. 2009).
156. Id. at 1132 (analyzing United States v. Murillo-Lopez, 444 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2006)).
157. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1132-33 (analyzing Wenner).
158. Wenner, 351 F.3d at 972 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.025(1) (2003)) (alterations
in original).
159. Wenner, 351 F.3d at 974.
160. Id. at 972-73.
161. Id. at 973.
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which limits burglary to buildings and other structures, and therefore, is
not a crime of violence. 6 2
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit distinguishes the Third and Eighth
Circuit decisions that expansively define dwelling as any enclosed space
used or intended for use as a human habitation. 16 3 Both of these prece-
dents were used in Rivera-Oros for support of the court's generic defini-
tion of dwelling.'TM The Wenner court distinguishes these cases because
neither holds that burglary defined as broadly as "residential burglaries"
under Washington law would qualify as "burglary of a dwelling" under
the USSG; they merely establish that burglary of hotel rooms and shel-
ters used as weekend fishing retreats are crimes of violence.165
b. The Wenner Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Wallace followed the same reasoning as the
Tenth Circuit-that the Taylor definition does not apply to the more pre-
cise definition of "burglary of a dwelling" under the USSG-and further
reasoned that Washington's residential burglary statute falls under the
residual clause of the USSG.16 Therefore, because the Taylor definition
of burglary does not apply to the more precise offense of "burglary of a
dwelling," the court should have determined whether "burglary of fenced
areas, railway cars, or cargo containers used for lodging constitutes bur-
glary of a dwelling under the Guidelines."l 6 7 Similar to the Tenth Cir-
cuit-and persuaded by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits' decisions-Judge
Wallace then created a general definition of "dwelling."' 6 8 The dissent
concluded that "dwelling" is any enclosed space, which is used or in-
tended for use as a human habitation; therefore, Washington's statute
should not be considered outside the definition of "burglary of a dwell-
ing" under the USSG.16 9
Alternatively, the dissent argued that the defendant's crime of resi-
dential burglary falls under the Guideline's residual clause: "conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another."170 Because
the classification of a crime as a "crime of violence" is a question of law
the court reviews de novo, the dissent stated the court has the option of
finding this alternative even if it was not raised in the parties' briefs and
the district court did not apply the residual clause.' 7 Furthermore, the
162. Id. (citing § 9A.04.110(5)).
163. Wenner, 351 F.3d at 973-74 (distinguishing the holdings in United States v. McClenton,
53 F.3d 584, 587 (3d Cir. 1995) and United States v. Graham, 982 F.2d 315, 316 (8th Cir. 1992)).
164. United States v. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d 1123, 1131-32 (10th Cir. 2009).
165. Wenner, 351 F.3d at 973.
166. Id. at 977 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 978.
168. Id. at 978-79 (citing McClenton, 53 F.3d at 587 and Graham, 982 F.2d at 316, respec-
tively).
169. Wenner, 351 F.3d at 978 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 980 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1l.2(a)(2) (2002)).
171. Wenner, 351 F.3d at 980 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
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Ninth Circuit's precedent and other sources unanimously concluded that
burglarizing a residence is a crime that presents a serious potential risk of
injury to another because of the very real possibility of violent confronta-
tion with the owner or with an investigating police officer.17
c. Discussion
One of the aims of the USSG is to provide a uniform structure for
sentencing. However, when both the Tenth and Ninth Circuits were pre-
sented with defendants receiving enhanced sentences for unlawfully en-
tering another's house, the courts followed different methods resulting in
different outcomes. The Tenth Circuit defined "burglary of a dwelling"
and found the defendant's conduct fit within this newly created generic
definition and was consequently a prior conviction for USSG pur-
poses.173 The Ninth Circuit limited the Taylor definition of "burglary" to
buildings or structures that are used as dwellings and found the defen-
dant's conduct did not constitute a prior conviction under the USSG be-
cause the statutory definition of dwelling was too broad. 174
The Tenth Circuit appears to have adopted a more thorough and
logical legal analysis in Rivera-Oros because there is a substantive dif-
ference between the USSG and the ACCA in this instance and burglary
of a house-the conduct at issue in Rivera-Oros and Wenner-is the
quintessential "burglary of a dwelling" imagined by the Sentencing
Commission. Both the Wenner and Rivera-Oros courts make note of the
Sentencing Commission's explicit divergence from the ACCA in the
area of burglary,' 75 but the Wenner court merely mentions the divergence
in a footnote and does not address it in its analysis. Furthermore, the
Wenner court does not consider the text of the guideline in question, or
the rationale for the differing language.176
Although the Tenth Circuit declines to apply the Taylor definition,
the circuit does not ignore Taylor in its analysis. Rivera-Oros is an ex-
ample of a court applying the Taylor methodology in creating a generic
definition for the enumerated felony at issue. Thus, Taylor is given due
deference and the court adheres to its procedure and looks at a wide
range of sources to determine the generic definition of an enumerated
offense. 77
In contrast, the Wenner court merely uses Taylor's generic defini-
tion of a similar, but different, enumerated offense, and applies it in con-
172. Id. at 981 (relying on United States v. M.C.E., 232 F.3d 1252, 1255 (9th Cir. 2000)).
173. United States v. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d 1123, 1132, 1134 (10th Cir. 2009).
174. Wenner, 351 F.3d at 972-73, 976.
175. See Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1129; Wenner, 351 F.3d at 973 n.2.
176. But see Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1129 ("Our analysis must be attuned to the particular
statute or guideline in question.").
177. See id. at 1126-27.
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junction with Washington's definition of dwelling.'78 In this manner, the
court determined that Mr. Wenner's conviction for entering Mr. Jewell's
residence falls outside of the enumerated offense and thus is not a crime
of violence.179 Instead of finding a generic definition of "dwelling," the
Ninth Circuit used Taylor's limitation to buildings and structures to find
Mr. Wenner's conviction of entering or remaining unlawfully in the resi-
dence of Mike Jewell outside the scope of burglary of a dwelling. 8 0
The Tenth Circuit's approach may mean that the USSG definition
of "burglary of a dwelling" encompasses more crimes than the more
general ACCA definition of burglary. But, this broader definition em-
phasizes the increased risk of physical and psychological harm caused by
the burglary of one's home, regardless of its architectural form.
In comparison, the Ninth Circuit's approach skips the step of con-
sidering what the Sentencing Commission intended by enumerating bur-
glary of a dwelling as opposed to burglary: the physical and psychologi-
cal harm that befalls victims of a burglary of their living space.' 8' There-
fore, the Ninth Circuit's approach means that burglarizing a camping tent
or motor home, a temporary lodging in Washington, may not be a crime
of violence because a tent is not a building or structure under Taylor's
burglary definition, and therefore, would not constitute a dwelling.182
Furthermore, while the Wenner dissent adopted much of the reason-
ing in Rivera-Oros, it did not consider the Supreme Court's ruling that
there must be a "realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility," that
the crime falls outside of the generic definition of an enumerated of-
fense.183 In Rivera-Oros, the Tenth Circuit considered Arizona case law
in finding whether the defendant's conviction fell outside the definition
of "burglary of a dwelling."' 84 Because the state interpreted its statute to
necessitate an inquiry into the nature and character of the space burglar-
ized (i.e., was the burgled space a place used for temporary habitation or
merely a gift shop in a hotel lobby'85 ), the defendant's conviction did not
fall outside of the generic definition of "dwelling."' 86
In Rivera-Oros, neither the majority nor the dissent made an inquiry
into Washington law and whether the state courts consider the "character
178. Wenner, 351 F.3d at 973.
179. Id. at 976.
180. Id. at 972-73, 976.
181. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1130.
182. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990) (citing statutes that were broader
than the generic definition because they included places other than buildings, including a Missouri
statute that defined burglary as breaking and entering any booth or tent).
183. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1133 (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193
(2007)).
184. Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1133-34.
185. Id.at1133.
186. Id at l34.
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of the use of the structure actually entered."' 87 Because of this missing
analysis, even the dissent's reasoning-that closely parallel's the Tenth
Circuit's-is problematic. The Wenner dissent presented no authority
that Washington considers the nature and character of the space when
charging a defendant with residential burglary. Thus, under the Ninth
Circuit's approach, courts are left with the text of the statute, which de-
fines "dwelling" as any building or structure used for lodging; there is no
evidence that, for instance, unlawfully entering shops housed in an
apartment building or nursing home would not constitute burglary of a
dwelling as the shops are in a building used by a person for lodging or as
a residence.
d. Will the Supreme Court Weigh-In?
Because the conflict between the Ninth and Tenth Circuits is one of
procedural application of a Supreme Court case, this split will likely be
heard by the High Court. The question posed by this conflict is the scope
of Taylor's definition and when a court is to engage in the method of
defining the "generic, contemporary meaning" 8 8 of an enumerated of-
fense under the ACCA and USSG. Clarifying these points may help re-
duce litigation and identify differences between the ACCA and USSG. A
Supreme Court decision on the matter would also be particularly helpful
in instances where there are more than four enumerated offenses, such as
USSG section 2L1.2(b), where crime of violence is defined by twelve
enumerated offenses. 189
2. Fleeing a Police Officer
Analyzing the circuit court decisions regarding the crime of fleeing
the police in a motor vehicle leads to unresolved, contradicting issues.
Due to a circuit split, either the Eighth Circuit needs to resolve the issue
or the Supreme Court should review.
a. United States v. Tyler'90 vs. Wise and McConnell
In Tyler, a case involving a defendant who wrecked his vehicle
while fleeing the police at excessive speeds and ignoring traffic signals,
the Eighth Circuit concluded that the Minnesota "crime of fleeing a
peace officer in a motor vehicle" is not a crime of violence under the
USSG.191 Applying the Begay test,192 thc court determined that the de-
187. Id. at 1133 (quoting State v. Gardella, 751 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988)).
188. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990).
189. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii) (2010).
190. 580 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2009).
191. Id. at 726.
192. See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S.137, 1584-86 (2008). The threshold question in
determining if the offense falls within the residual clause of the ACCA is whether it presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Id at 1584. Second, the court must determine if
the offense is "roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed" to the enumerated of-
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fendant's conduct-although purposeful--did not typically involve con-
duct presenting a serious risk of physical injury to another, or conduct
that is violent and aggressive.' 93 The court concluded that fleeing a police
officer does not pose a serious risk of bodily injury because the Minne-
sota statute does not require high speed or reckless driving.1 94 Further-
more, the statute includes a separate subsection that criminalizes the act
of fleeing when it causes death or bodily injury, indicating to the Tyler
court that simply fleeing a police officer is mere disobedience and nor-
mally does not rise to the level of posing a serious risk of physical in-
jury.19
5
Similarly, the offense cannot be said to typically involve violent and
aggressive conduct. In defining "flee," Minnesota criminalizes conduct
that is not violent and aggressive because "flee" includes turning off
headlights and taillights and increasing the speed of the vehicle.196 Such
actions do not reveal the propensity of an offender to act violently to-
wards others.197 Likewise, these actions do not necessarily lead to chase
and/or confrontation as the government contends. The statute does not
make confrontation an element of the crime, and in fact, requires no
"conduct presenting a serious risk of physical injury to another or con-
duct that is violent and aggressive."l 98
The Eighth Circuit is aware that its reasoning differs from the deci-
sions in the Tenth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, but manages to distinguish
or disregard each of these opinions. The court distinguishes West, and
thus the later decisions of Wise and McConnell, and the Fifth circuit
case' 99 because the statutes at issue in those cases do not define "flee" so
broadly as to include behavior such as increasing speed and extinguish-
ing headlights and taillights. 20 0 The Sixth Circuit in United States v. La-
Casse,201 however, considered a statute similar to the Minnesota statute
at issue in Tyler and found that the crime was a violent felony under the
ACCA.20 2 The Eighth Circuit merely states they disagree with the Sixth
Circuit and terminates the discussion, with no further elaboration on the
ensuing circuit split. 203
fenses. Id at 1585. A crime is "roughly similar" if it "typically involve[s] purposeful, violent, and
aggressive conduct." Id. at 1586 (internal quotation marks omitted).






199. Id. at 726 (referencing United States v. Harrimon, 568 F.3d 531, 537 (5th Cir. 2009)).
200. Tyler, 580 F.3d at 726.
201. 567 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2009).
202. Id. at 765-67.
203. Tyler, 580 F.3d at 726.
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Expressing profound concern about the majority's decision in Tyler,
Judge Limbaugh wrote a dissent that critiqued the majority's failure to
consider the actual language of the residual clause and its failure to con-
204sider the record of the case at issue. First, the dissent accused the ma-
jority of misreading the residual clause; Judge Limbaugh argued that the
clause calls for a potential serious risk of injury as opposed to an actual
risk.205 The potential serious risk is definitely present when a defendant
extinguishes headlights or taillights while fleeing an officer; the lack of
vehicle lighting means that other drivers and peace officers cannot see
the fleeing car, therefore creating the potential serious risk of vehicle
accidents. 206
Furthermore, the dissent argued that the presence of a separate sub-
division creating additional penalty for fleeing an officer that results in
death or great bodily injury is an argument for classification of the crime
as a crime of violence. 207 The separate subdivision in question criminal-
izes the exact same conduct if death or serious bodily injury occurs; the
subdivision does not add extra requirements of reckless driving or con-
frontation.208 The dissent reasoned that because the same conduct is more
seriously punished in the instance of death or bodily injury, it points to
the offense as one that has potential serious risk of injury to another.209
The dissent also used the underlying facts of the defendant's con-
viction to show the typical way the offense occurs and determine the
specific elements for which the defendant was charged.2 10 The dissent
intended to demonstrate that by isolating only one way the offense may
be committed-extinguishing headlights or increasing speed-the major-
ity was directly contradicting the Eighth Circuit's holding 211 in United
States v. Gordon.212 Tyler was driving at "excessive speeds" while ignor-
ing traffic signals and signs, and lost control of his car, running into a
213cemetery gate. Furthermore, even if the majority was correct in
"cherry-picking" 214 one way the offense can be committed, its reasoning
does not hold because the conduct must be coupled with the intent to
204. See id. at 727-29 (Limbaugh, J., dissenting). Judge Limbaugh argued that precedent
clearly states the court is within its power to use a modified categorical appmach. Id. at 730.
205. Id. at 727.
206. Id
207. Id. at 728.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 727.
210. Id. at 727-28.
211. Id. at 729.
212. 557 F.3d 623, 625 (8th Cir. 2009) ("[A] statute can be violated in a number of ways, 'we
look to the charging papers for the limited purpose of determining the specific elements for which
[the defendant] was convicted."').
213. Tyler, 580 F.3d at 728 (Limbaugh, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 729.
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elude a police officer, 2 15 and therefore, increases the potential serious risk
for injury to another in the form of a chase or confrontation.216
b. Discussion
The Tenth Circuit and the Tyler dissent make the more compelling
legal and logical argument for several reasons. First, the residual clause
of USSG section 4B1.2 reads: "conduct that presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another."2 17 By ignoring the word "potential" in
the residual clause, the Tyler majority made a crucial mistake because it
disregards the firmly held belief by Congress and the courts that certain
crimes increase the probability of violent confrontation. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court-in the context of a burglary analysis-has stated that
"potential risk" expressed congressional intent to "encompass possibili-
ties even more contingent or remote than a simple 'risk,' much less a
certainty." 218 Some form of burglary has been an enumerated offense in
the ACCA and the USSG since their promulgation in the mid-1980s. An
examination of legislative history and case law has repeatedly shown the
rationale behind enumerating burglary is the potential for violent con-
frontation with the occupant or investigating officers. 219 Generic bur-
glary, like the Minnesota fleeing statute, does not require confrontation
as an element, but it is nevertheless considered conduct that presents a
potential serious risk of physical harm because of increased risk of vio-
lent confrontation. Simply because the Minnesota statute does not require
confrontation does not mean that it is not a potential risk of the pro-
scribed conduct. The majority errs in its reasoning when it looks for con-
duct that "necessarily . . . present[s] a serious risk of physical injury to
another;" rather, the question is whether the potential for risk exists. 22 0
Second, the Eighth Circuit's analysis of the circuit split is mis-
placed. Given the opportunity-and following its precedent established
in West, Wise, and McConnell-the Tenth Circuit would have likely con-
cluded that fleeing a police officer under the Minnesota statute was a
crime of violence for two main reasons: (1) similar to the Eighth Circuit,
the Tenth Circuit has justified a modified categorical approach and an
examination of the charging documents and plea agreement when there is
more than one way in which to commit the offense; 221 and (2) the Tenth
Circuit has repeatedly affirmed the notion that statutes criminalizing
215. Id.
216. See id. at 729-30.
217. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4Bl.2(a)(2) (2010).
218. James, 550 U.S. at 207-08; see also April K. Whitescarver, Chambers v. United States:
Filling the Gaps When Interpreting the Armed Career Criminal Act, 13 JONES L. REv. 89, 95
(2009).
219. E.g., James, 550 U.S. at 209; Martinez, 602 F.3d at 1169-70; Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at
1130.
220. Tyler, 580 F.3d at 725.
221. Wise, 597 F.3d at 1144.
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flight from a police officer are similar to escape in that they create an
increased potential for serious injury to others because the crime is
committed in the presence of a police officer.222
Because the Minnesota statute can be violated by several types of
conduct, the Tenth Circuit would have employed a modified categorical
approach and looked to the charging documents for the specific violation
with which the defendant was charged and would have likely con-
cluded-similar to the Tyler dissent-that Mr. Tyler's charging docu-
ments indicate the conduct is a crime of violence.223 Additionally, the
Tenth Circuit emphasizes the potential confrontation and presence of
third parties in its decisions addressing both fleeing 2 24 and burglary. 22 5
The definition of "flee" in the Minnesota statute would have likely con-
cerned the Tenth Circuit, but the potential for the police officer to pursue
the driver who extinguishes his headlights and creates the potential for
violent confrontation or traffic accidents would have prevailed; the Tenth
Circuit, unlike the Tyler majority, would have focused on the potential
aspect of the residual clause because of its precedent 226 emphasizing po-
tential for confrontation during the commission of a burglary.
In the Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Harrimon,227 a modified
categorical approach was not employed because the Texas statute did not
have multiple subsections and could only be violated in one way.228
Thus, the charging documents never become became a relevant line of
inquiry for the court. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit is in line with the
other circuits in determining that fleeing a police officer is aggressive
and violent in nature because it is a challenge to the officer's authority
and typically initiates pursuit, similar to an escape from custody. 229 The
definition of "flee" was not at issue in this case.
The only case that agreed with Tyler's assessment that fleeing does
not lead to potential serious risk of injury to another came from the Elev-
enth Circuit, United States v. Harrison.230 Similar to Tyler, Harrison held
that a statute that criminalizes fleeing without the inclusion of a reckless
or high-speed element is not the type of career criminal the USSG or the
ACCA intended to punish. 2 3 1 The court stated that statistics showing the
likelihood of physical injury in willful fleeing crimes that do not have the
222. E.g., id. at 1146.
223. See id. at 1144.
224. Id. at 1147.
225. E.g., United States v. Martinez, 602 F.3d 1166, 1169-70(10th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2009).
226. See Martinez, 602 F.3d at 1169; Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1130.
227. 568 F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2009).
228. See id. at 533 n.2.
229. Id. at 534-35.
230. 558 F.3d 1280, 1296 (11 th Cir. 2009).
231. Id. at 1295-96.
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elements of high speed or recklessness would have been helpful and il-
232lustrative.
Given these concurrent holdings, why is it, then, that the Tyler court
did not mention the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in its analysis? The
answer may lie in the fact that the Eleventh Circuit pursued a modified
categorical approach, one that was rejected by the court in Tyler. 233In-
deed, in Harrison, the Eleventh Circuit differentiated between the differ-
ent subsections to determine with what, exactly, the defendant was
charged.234 The court in Harrison noted that the defendant was not
charged with the subsection of the statute requiring high speed or reck-
2351-thless driving. As a result, the defendant was found guilty of the less
serious conduct of disobeying a peace officer by driving away at a rea-
sonable speed.236
Similarly, the majority in Tyler misread the LaCasse case because
the statute at issue was not in fact similar to that in Tyler.23 According to
the Tyler majority, LaCasse analyzed a statute similar to Minnesota's
and found that the defendant's conviction constituted a crime of vio-
lence. 238 The defendant in LaCasse was convicted of third-degree fleeing
or eluding, which requires that the fleeing conduct occur in a thirty-five
mile per hour zone or that the violation resulted in an accident. 23 9 The
LaCasse court used a modified categorical approach to determine the
specific crime of which the defendant was convicted.20 The court con-
cluded that these requirements translated to purposeful and aggressive
conduct that had the potential for serious injury to another and was thus a
crime of violence, despite the statute's definition of "flee." 24 1 The defini-
tion of "flee" was not addressed by the court, and consequently it did not
decide that a defendant convicted of fleeing by extinguishing headlights
and taillights was a crime of violence. Therefore, the Tyler court incor-
rectly cited LaCasse as a case dealing with a similar definition of "flee."
Finally, the Eighth Circuit has created an intra-circuit split. The Ty-
ler opinion was filed in June of 2009 and a decision was rendered in Sep-
242tember of 2009. A second Eighth Circuit case addressing a fleeing
statute, United States v. Hudson,24 3 was filed in April of 2009 and a deci-
232. Id. at 1295.
233. Tyler, 580 F.3d at 724-25.
234. Harrison, 558 F.3d at 1284-85.
235. See id. at 1290-91.
236. Id.
237. See United States v. LaCasse, 567 F.3d 763, 765, 767 (2009) (finding that a fleeing of-
fense under Michigan statute is a violent felony).
238. Id. at 765.
239. Id.
240. See id. at 765-66.
241. Id.at766.
242. United States v. Tyler, 580 F.3d 722, 722 (8th Cir. 2009).
243. 577 F.3d 883 (8th Cir. 2009).
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sion was rendered in August of 2009.244 Hudson addressed a Missouri
statute and found that a conviction for fleeing was a crime of violence.245
Interestingly, Tyler does not discuss Hudson. This is especially odd be-
cause Hudson explicitly found that resisting arrest by fleeing "inevitably
,246invites confrontation," creating a direct contradiction with the court in
247
Tyler.
It is arguable that the Eighth Circuit has not contradicted itself be-
cause the statute at issue in Hudson expressly stated that resisting arrest
or fleeing must be conducted in such a manner that the person fleeing
"creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury or death to any per-
son."248 In Hudson, the Eighth Circuit did not question the presence of a
potential risk of injury because it was an express element of the statute.
The question was one of language as opposed to legal substance. Thus, a
new question is presented: whether a state can linguistically create a
crime of violence or violent felony by merely inserting key phrases from
the ACCA or USSG into its statute.
After summarily dispatching the potential injury question, the Hud-
son court found "purposeful conduct" because the defendant knowingly
fled a police officer. 249 Additionally the court found "violent and aggres-
sive conduct" because "[r]esisting arrest by fleeing inevitably invites
confrontation" and "resisting arrest by fleeing in a dangerous manner
involves more violent and aggressive conduct." 250 The Tyler court would
likely respond that there was no indication that the Missouri statute
broadly defined "flee," and that by requiring fleeing in a manner physi-
cally harmful to others, the definition of "flee" is narrow and can there-
fore be considered a crime of violence. This is the same way the Tyler
court distinguished the Tenth and Fifth Circuits and is subject to the
same legal and logistical problems discussed above. Furthermore, the
Hudson court never addressed the definition of "flee" and had no cause
to do so.
c. Will the Supreme Court Weigh-In?
The Eighth Circuit Tyler case is an anomaly in ACCA and USSG
jurisprudence regarding the crime of fleeing the police in a motor vehi-
cle. Tyler splits with the Tenth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, and in light of
Hudson, seems to create an intra-circuit split. Because of these splits and
considcring the Supreme Court's recent attention to recidivist sentencing
issues, the Court would likely grant certiorari in order to clarify the usage
244. Id. at 883.
245. Id. at 886.
246. Id.
247. Tyler, 580 F.3d at 725.
248. Hudson, 577 F.3d at 885 (emphasis added).
249. Id. at 886.
250. Id.
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of categorical and modified categorical approaches and the potential se-
rious risk involved in fleeing a police officer. In addition, the Supreme
Court may hear the issue if the Eighth Circuit does not resolve contra-
dicting opinions: Does fleeing invite confrontation, or not?
3. Juvenile Adjudications as Prior Convictions
In another matter, there is a controversial split regarding the use of
juvenile adjudications as predicate offenses for the ACCA. The Ninth
Circuit is the outlier in this split and reasons that juvenile adjudications
should not be predicate offenses in light of the Supreme Court decisions
in Apprendi v. New Jersey251 and Jones v. United States (Jones I),252
which imply that facts for sentencing enhancements must be subject to
the safeguards of a jury.2 5 3 The right to a jury trial accorded to criminal
defendants by the Sixth Amendment does not apply to juvenile adjudica-
tion proceedings, and therefore, adjudications are not prior convictions to
be used for sentencing enhancements under the ACCA.254
However, all other circuits that have addressed this issue find that a
jury trial is not a prerequisite for using a prior conviction as a predicate
offense for the ACCA;255 all that is required is that the defendant receives
256all the due process required at the time of his conviction. Due process
does not demand jury trials for juvenile adjudications, but juveniles are
afforded many other procedural safeguards that make the adjudications
sufficiently reliable for Apprendi purposes.2 57 Therefore, these circuits
concluded that juvenile adjudications are predicate offenses for purposes
of the ACCA.2 58
The Tenth Circuit has not yet considered this issue, but below is an
outline of the major cases defining the circuit split. The next section ana-
lyzes the reasoning of these cases and predicts where the Tenth Circuit
may fall.
a. United States v. Tighe 259: Adjudications are Not Predicate
Offenses
In its solitary decision, the Tighe court begins by limiting the appli-
cability of its earlier precedent, United States v. Williams,260 which stated
251. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
252. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
253. United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1193-95 (9th Cir. 2001).
254. Id. at 1194.
255. See, e.g., United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1032-33 (8th Cir. 2002).
256. See id.
257. See id. at 1033.
258. See id; see also United Stated v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2007); United
States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750-51 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183,
1190-91 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir. 2003).
259. 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001).
260. 891 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1989).
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the use of juvenile adjudications-as predicate offenses for sentencing
enhancements-did not violate due process.261 The court notes that this
decision was made "pre-Apprendi" and the nature of the sentencing deci-
sion was fundamentally different than the ACCA.262 In the Williams case,
the defendant's ultimate sentence was within the statutorily mandated
maximum for the offense; in contrast, the ACCA goes beyond the statu-
tory maximum and mandates an additional five years, making the sen-
263tence at least fifteen years of incarceration. The Ninth Circuit poses an
entirely different question in Tighe. There, the court considered the use
of juvenile adjudications in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Ap-
prendi, which defined the due process requirements when a court seeks
to sentence a defendant beyond the statutory maximum.264
Tighe analyzes the cases leading up to Apprendi to find that jury tri-
als and proof beyond a reasonable doubt are due process requirements
for increasing a defendant's maximum sentence.265 The Supreme Court
in Apprendi stated that the certainty of procedural safeguards was crucial
to the decision of Almendarez-Torres, finding prior convictions to be
sentencing factors that are not required to be charged in an indictment.266
Later, in Jones I, the Court found that a prior conviction is different from
other sentence enhancing facts, and therefore, does not have to be sub-
mitted to a jury or proven beyond a reasonable doubt, because it must
have been established through procedures satisfying fair notice, reason-
able doubt, and jury trial guarantees.267 The Tighe majority takes the
three safeguards enumerated in Jones I and makes them the necessary
elements required for all facts increasing a sentence beyond the statutory
maximum: (1) fair notice; (2) proof beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3)
261. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1192; Williams, 891 F.2d at 215.
262. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1192.
263. Id. at 1192 & n.2; see Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006).
264. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1193; see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000).
265. First, the court looks at Almendarez- Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), which
labeled prior convictions a sentencing factor that was not a separate element of the crime that had to
be charged in the indictment. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1193 (discussing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at
243). Next, the Tighe court analyzes Jones I to show why the fact of a prior conviction is constitu-
tionally distinct from other sentence-enhancing facts (such as use of a deadly weapon, use of explo-
sives, committing an offense with extreme cruelty, etc.). Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1193 (discussing Jones I,
526 U.S. 227, 249 (1998)). In Jones 1 the Court finds that a prior conviction must have been estab-
lished through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees. 526
U.S. at 249. Lastly, the Tighe court turns to Apprendi where the Supreme Court created an exception
for prior convictions in its due process requirement for facts enhancing a sentence beyond the statu-
tory maximum. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1193-94 (discussing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490). This is referred
to as the Apprendi exception. See, e.g., Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194. The exception states: "Other than
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 490. Therefore, the issue becomes the definition of "conviction" under Apprendi.
266. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488; Almendarez- Torres, 523 U.S. at 243 (citing Graham v. West
Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 624 (1912)).
267. Jones I, 526 U.S. at 249.
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the right to a jury trial constitute "the fundamental triumvirate of proce-
,,268dural protections.
Thus, the Tighe court reads Apprendi as requiring a jury trial in or-
der to satisfy the procedural safeguards necessary to constitute a prior
conviction that would enhance a defendant's sentence beyond a statutory
maximum. 269 In justifying their decision, the Ninth Circuit quotes Ap-
prendi:
There is a vast difference between accepting the validity of a prior
judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defen-
dant had the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the judge to
find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof.270
The Tighe court reasoned that the Apprendi exception for prior con-
victions must be limited to convictions that were obtained through pro-
ceedings that included the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reason-
able doubt.271 In conclusion, the Tighe court found that because the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial is not afforded in juvenile adjudications,
those proceedings are not prior convictions that constitute predicate of-
fenses for the ACCA.2 72
The Tighe dissent took the diametrically opposed position. The dis-
sent argued that juvenile adjudications are predicate offenses because the
language in Jones I and Apprendi merely means that prior convictions
need not be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt
because they have due process procedural safeguards in place that make
this sentencing factor sufficiently reliable. 2 73 The dissent interpreted
Jones I as holding that prior convictions are merely sentencing factors
that are subject to a lesser standard of proof because the defendant re-
ceived all the process that was due to him when he was convicted of the
earlier crime.274 In Tighe, the defendant was adjudicated delinquent with
all the due process due to him at the time, and this did not include a jury
trial.275 The fact that there was not a jury trial does not preclude the de-
linquent adjudication from being a prior conviction and predicate offense
under the ACCA.276
Furthermore, the dissent contends that if the prosecution has to
prove a prior juvenile adjudication beyond a reasonable doubt-as the
268. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1193.
269. Id. at 1194-95.
270. Id. at 1194 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496).
271. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194.
272. Id
273. Id at 1200 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
274. Id
275. See id. at 1198-99.
276. Id at 1200.
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majority requires-this will allow the jury to hear about prior offenses, a
277
procedure that would be unduly prejudicial. The defendant will have to
make a choice: stipulate, or allow the jury to hear.278
b. United States v. Smalley,279 United States v. Jones (Jones
I),280 United States v. Burge,281 United States v. Mat-
thews,282 and United States v. Crowell
283
In chronological order, the Eighth, Third, Eleventh, First, and Sixth
Circuits found fault with the Tighe majority and adopted the reasoning of
the Tighe dissent. These courts found that juvenile adjudications were
constitutionally sound convictions under Apprendi and could therefore be
considered prior convictions for sentencing enhancement under the
ACCA.
Because the post-Tighe opinions have strikingly little variation in
their reasoning, the following is a summary of the Smalley court's opin-
284ion.
The Smalley court first recounts Tighe and then states that it respect-
fully disagrees with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and proceeds with its
own.285 The Smalley court adopted the certainty of procedural protections
language in Apprendi and uses it as the foundation of the opinion:
We think that while the Court [in Apprendi] established what consti-
tutes sufficient procedural safeguards (a right to a jury trial and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt), and what does not (judge-made findings
under a lesser standard of proof), the Court did not take a position on
possibilities that lie in between these two poles. 286
According to the Smalley court, the Ninth Circuit erred when it
found that the procedural triumvirate was necessary instead of sufficient
because Jones I did not intend to define the term "prior conviction" as
that which had been established through fair notice, reasonable doubt,
and trial by jury guarantees.287
Moreover, Smalley reasoned that the decision should not turn on the
"parsing of words" of Supreme Court opinions, but on the reliability of a
288prior conviction. Juvenile adjudications are reliable because they are
277. Id. at 1201.
278. Id. at 1200-01.
279. 294 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2002).
280. 332 F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 2003).
281. 407 F.3d 1183 (1 th Cir. 2005).
282. 498 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007).
283. 493 F.3d 744 (6th Cir. 2007).
284. Any differences in the other opinions are noted in the following text.
285. Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1032.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1032-33.
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afforded the safeguards of right to notice, the right to counsel, the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, the privilege against self-
incrimination, and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 289 The court con-
cluded these guarantees "are more than sufficient to ensure the reliability
that Apprendi requires." 290 To support its conclusion that these proce-
dures are more than sufficient, the court quoted a Supreme Court case
from 1971 that found the use of a jury in a juvenile adjudication would
"'not strengthen greatly, if at all, the fact-finding function' and is not
constitutionally required."291
Jones II and Burge have conspicuously added little to this analysis;
both merely go through the decisions of Tighe and Smalley and conclude
292they agree with the Tighe dissent and Smalley's reasoning. Jones II
primarily uses the Tighe dissent to justify its analysis; the court finds that
the defendant was afforded all the procedural safeguards that he was
constitutionally due at the time of his adjudication.2 93 Burge analyzes
Jones I and Apprendi, but it is largely an amalgamation of quotes from
the Tighe dissent and Smalley.294 Crowell simply combined Smalley,
Jones II, and the Tighe dissent. The Crowell court cites Jones II and
Tighe for the proposition that a defendant need only receive all the proc-
ess he was due when convicted. 2 9 5 It also cites to Smalley for the proposi-
tion of evaluating the realities and procedural safeguards of juvenile
296court and the resulting reliability of juvenile adjudications. However,
the Crowell court did not discuss juvenile court procedures or statistics to
illuminate the "reality" to which it refers. Crowell "join[s] the Third,
Eighth, and Eleventh circuits in finding that the imposition of a sentence
enhancement under the ACCA based on a defendant's juvenile adjudica-
tion without a jury trial does not violate the defendant's due process right
or run afoul of Apprendi."297 The court made no further analysis.298
289. Id at 1033.
290. Id.
291. Id (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) (plurality opinion)).
292. United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1189-90 (11th Cir. 2005); Jones II, 332 F.3d 688,
694-97 (3d Cir 2003).
293. Jones II, 332 F.3d at 695-96, 698; see United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1200-01
(9th Cir. 2001) (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
294. See Burge, 407 F.3d at 1188-90.
295. United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Matthews is the one case with slight, but insubstantial differences. The defendant in Mat-
thews first argued that Massachusetts law did not classify juvenile adjudications as criminal and
therefore they could not be predicate offenses under the ACCA. United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d
25, 33 (1st Cir. 2007). Although the court refused to address this argument because it was not raised
and preserved at trial, it gave a succinct insight into what it might have ruled. Id. The court noted
that: "[The defendant] cites no cases holding that Congress oversteps constitutional bounds by ignor-
ing state law classifications and treating particular juvenile acts as criminal in nature." Id. The
ACCA only narrowly extended juvenile adjudications into criminal convictions and it saw no basis
for denying Congress this prerogative. Id. The court in Matthews then predictably proceeded to
rehash Tighe, disagree, and quote Smalley for the proposition that the safeguards required in juvenile
[Vol. 88:2500
2011] VIOLENT FELONIES AND CRIMES OF VIOLENCE
c. The Juvenile Adjudication Quandary and the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) 299
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit heard a case similar to Tighe; a defendant
appealed his sentence enhancement based on a prior juvenile adjudica-
tion.300 Although the sentencing enhancement in Boyd v. Newland301 was
based on California law-as opposed to federal law-and did not involve
the ACCA, 302 the Ninth Circuit's reasoning is nonetheless relevant to the
juvenile adjudication circuit split.
The Boyd court noted that it had previously held that the Apprendi
exception does not apply to juvenile adjudications, and therefore, such
adjudications cannot be prior convictions for sentencing enhance-
ments.303 However, it then stated, "California courts disagree with Tighe.
They conclude that Apprendi does not preclude the use of nonjury juve-
nile adjudications to enhance the sentence of an adult offender."304 The
court further noted that the Third and Eighth Circuits also disagree with
Tighe and found it unpersuasive.30s In concluding, without overruling
Tighe, the Ninth Circuit upheld Boyd's enhanced sentence using the pro-
cedural situation of the case: a habeas petition under the AEDPA, §
2254(d)(1). 3 06 The Boyd court stated:
In general, Ninth Circuit precedent remains persuasive authority in
determining what is clearly established federal law. But, in the face
of authority that is directly contrary to Tighe, and in the absence of
explicit direction from the Supreme Court, we cannot hold that the
California courts' use of Petitioner's juvenile adjudication as a sen-
tencing enhancement was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, Supreme Court precedent.307
The phrase "clearly established federal law" and the requirement of
a Supreme Court ruling on the issue for a higher court to reverse a lower
court's sentencing decision (a habeas matter) is a result of the AEDPA.30
The relevant provision is § 2254(d)(1), which states:
adjudications were "more than sufficient" for reliability under Apprendi standards. Id. at 34-35. The
only remaining difference is that the defendant in Matthews was offered a jury trial in accordance
with Massachusetts law and refused. Thus, the court need not decide the necessity of the jury issue
(but strongly implied its decision in dicta). Id. at 35.
299. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110
Stat. 1214, 1218-19 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
300. Boyd v. Newland, 393 F.3d 1008, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2004).
301. 393 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2004).
302. Id. at 1016.
303. Id. (citing United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001)).
304. Boyd, 393 F.3d at 1017 (citing People v. Bowden, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 517 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002), a California case upholding the use of a juvenile adjudication as a predicate offense for
the California Three Strikes law).
305. Boyd, 393 F.3d at 1017 (discussing Smalley and Jones II).
306. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000)).




An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
... unless the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States .... 309
Thus, as a result of the AEDPA and its cornerstone habeas provi-
sion under § 2254(d)(1), the Ninth Circuit cannot follow its precedent in
Tighe and reverse sentence enhancements based on juvenile adjudica-
tions for defendants in state custody because the Supreme Court has not
ruled on the issue as required by § 2254(d)(1). 310 Yet, if a defendant in
federal court is merely appealing his federal trial court's sentence, the
AEDPA does not apply, and Tighe remains applicable.
d. Discussion
When reading the above ACCA cases in succession, the lack of
unique and independent analysis is jarring. Once Tighe and its dissent
were published, the subsequent discussions of the Apprendi exception
and procedural protections in Jones I were mirror images of one another
with little, if any, variation in arguments. In fact, some courts merely
quoted language from other circuits, coming to conclusions without any
further justification or examination."
For example, in Burge, the court engaged in a summary of Tighe,
Smalley, and Jones II and concluded: "After reviewing the record, we
conclude that this application was correct. We base our holding on the
reasoning of our sister circuits in Smalley and Jones [II]."312 Like "the
Smalley court, we find nothing in Apprendi or Jones [II], two cases re-
lied upon by the Tighe court . .. that requires us to hold that prior non-
jury juvenile adjudications ... cannot be used to enhance a sentence un-
der the ACCA."313 Thus, it would seem that both Jones II and Burge
complacently use the Smalley decision without questioning its findings
or reasoning. Matthews and Crowell also adopt the Smalley analysis
without considering the actual procedure of juvenile adjudications as
opposed to their theoretical due process protections.314
309. Id
310. Similarly, in a one-page memorandum from the Ninth Circuit, the court, citing Boyd,
again decided that using a defendant's juvenile adjudication for a predicate offense under Califor-
nia's Three-Strikes law was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Solorzano v. Yates, 264 F. App'x 576, 577 (9th Cir. 2008). The court also notes that certiorari was
denied in the Boyd case. Id.
311. E.g., United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1190 (1Ith Cir. 2005).
312. Id.
313. Id. (citing Jones II, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir. 2003)).
314. United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[A]ll of the courts to con-
sider the issue have agreed that 'the question of whether juvenile adjudications should be exempt
from Apprendi's general rule should [ ] turn on ... an examination of whether juvenile adjudica-
tions, like adult adjudications, are so reliable that due process of law is not offended by such an
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The analysis most pertinent to the prior conviction issue is the as-
sumptions made about the practice of due process in juvenile court and
the reliability of adjudications because of that process. Although outlined
in more detail below in Part II.C.2,3 " the issue of juvenile adjudication
reliability bears mentioning here. The Smalley court pointed out the ex-
tensive due process protections mandated by the Supreme Court in juve-
nile proceedings and concluded that the adjudications are reliable be-
cause of these procedures.3 16 Smalley pontificates that the decision
should not rest on a "narrow parsing of words," but the "reality of the
actual juvenile adjudications to determine whether it is sufficiently reli-
able so as not to offend" the juvenile's due process rights. 317
Nonetheless, the court never engages in an investigation of juvenile
court realities; it merely notes that juveniles are required to receive suffi-
cient due process rights to make them akin to the procedural certainty of
adult criminal court. 31 8 This oversight ignores the original philosophies
of informality and rehabilitation underlying the juvenile court system and
the increasingly narrow line between juvenile court and adult criminal
court.
More specifically, the Tighe dissent and its progeny also have prob-
lematic legal arguments regarding the application of Apprendi to juvenile
adjudications. First, in dismissing the Jones I's enumeration of the pro-
cedures making a prior conviction constitutionally distinct, 319 the Tighe
dissent and its progeny do not consider the syntax of the enumeration.
Second, the Tighe dissent's worry about unduly prejudicing the defen-
dant by forcing the prosecution to prove adjudications beyond a reason-
able doubt to a jury is easily alleviated.320
The Jones I language that the Tighe majority emphasized is as fol-
lows:
One basis for that constitutional distinctiveness [of prior convictions]
is not hard to see: unlike virtually any other consideration used to en-
exemption.' We share that view of the question." (alterations in original) (citation omitted)); United
States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[W]e join the Third, Eighth, and Eleventh
circuits in finding that the imposition of a sentence enhancement under the ACCA based on a defen-
dant's juvenile adjudication without a jury trial does not violate the defendant's due process right or
run afoul of Apprendi.").
315. See discussion infra Part IC3.
316. United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002). Procedures include the
right to notice, the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the privilege
against self incrimination, and a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
317. Jones II, 332 F.3d at 696; Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1033.
318. Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1033.
319. The Court in Jones I enumerates three characteristics that make a prior conviction distinct
from other facts increasing a defendant's sentence. Jones 1, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999) (noting "a
prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice,
reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees").
320. See United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2010) (Brunetti, J., dissent-
ing).
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large the possible penalty for an offense . .. a prior conviction must
itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair
notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees.321
Tighe also emphasized that Apprendi identified trial by jury as a requisite
procedural safeguard. 22 Many of the post Tighe courts noted that Jones I
did not intend to establish the criteria for the procedures necessary for a
prior conviction, 323 but these opinions do not recognize that the language
of Jones I is a list of procedures joined by the conjunction "and": "pro-
cedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guaran-
tees."324 Thus, a linguistic analysis reveals that these procedures are all
necessary for a prior conviction. Furthermore, Jones I uses a serial
comma before the "and," indicating that the procedures are three separate
and distinct entities that establish the constitutional distinction of a prior
325conviction.32 Interestingly, some courts misquote Jones I by leaving out
this final comma.326
The argument that this language is dicta is strong; however, the only
court to make this argument is a California state court;327 none of the
federal opinions relying on the Tighe dissent or Smalley decision make
an argument concerning dicta. Yet, even if the Jones I language is dic-
tum, the fact that it is a recent Supreme Court case addressing sentencing
enhancements that increase the statutory maximum sentence, the exact
effect of the ACCA sentencing enhancement, makes the dicta arguably
more persuasive and authoritative. 328
The dissent in Tighe further argues that the majority's opinion pre-
sents a procedural issue that will unduly prejudice the defendant by put-
ting his prior crimes before the jury.329 The dissent underscores the sig-
nificant prejudice created when prior crimes are introduced, and articu-
lates its fear that "a defendant with a prior juvenile adjudication will be
321. Id. at 1193 (majority opinion) (alterations in original) (quoting Jones I, 526 U.S. at 249).
322. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194; see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 496 (2000).
323. See, e.g., Jones II, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir. 2003); Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1032 ("We do
not think, moreover, that Jones [1] meant to define the term 'prior conviction' for constitutional
purposes as a conviction 'that has been established through procedures satisfying fair notice, reason-
able doubt and jury trial guarantees."').
324. Jones 1, 526 U.S. at 249 (emphasis added).
325. See id.
326. See, e.g., Jones II, 332 F.3d at 695; Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1193.
327. See, e.g., People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946, 956 (Cal. 2009), a California Supreme Court
decision disagreeing with Tighe, puts forth the dicta argument.
328. The Third Circuit, home of the Jones II opinion, finds Supreme Court dicta to be highly
persuasive. In a recently published opinion, the court states: "The Supreme Court grants certiorari in
fewer than 85 cases annually, and thus, provides precedent on very few issues. Accordingly, the
Court's dicta is highly persuasive and should be treated as binding unless there are indications to the
contrary . . . ." United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 735 n.1 (3d Cir. 2010) (Cowen, J., dissent-
ing). The persuasiveness of Supreme Court dicta is well-established in the Third Circuit. See also
Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm'n, 490 F.3d 265, 274 (3d Cir. 2007); Official Comm. of Unse-
cured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 561 (3d Cir. 2003).
329. Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1200-01 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).
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put to the Hobson's choice of stipulating to the priors or parading them
before a jury."330 However, as the majority makes clear, such a prejudice
can be avoided by a separate jury sentencing phase or other procedural
protections. 3 31 The dissent's objection seems to be pro forma as other
courts have fashioned procedures for minimizing the prejudice of prior
convictions when the prior conviction is a sentencing factor.332
C. The Tenth Circuit and Juvenile Adjudications
1. How will the Tenth Circuit Rule?
As of April 2011, the Tenth Circuit had not yet considered the ques-
tion of juvenile adjudications as predicate offenses under the ACCA.
This section aims to predict how the Tenth Circuit may rule on the con-
troversial issue. First, the Tenth Circuit seems to have a different inter-
pretation of ACCA and USSG challenges than the Ninth Circuit. Second,
there is no indication that the Circuit will engage in any further analysis
than Smalley and its progeny. And third, the Circuit has considered the
application of Apprendi to juvenile law issues and has concluded that
Apprendi does not apply.333
As mentioned, the Tenth Circuit parted from the Ninth Circuit in
Rivera-Oros, on the issue of the meaning and scope of ACCA and
USSG. In Rivera-Oros, the Tenth Circuit declined to adopt the Ninth
Circuit's approach to defining "burglary of a dwelling" under the USSG.
The Tenth Circuit applied the Taylor procedure for defining the generic
definition of an enumerated crime, but found that Taylor's definition of
mere "burglary" under the ACCA should not be applied to "burglary of a
dwelling" under the USSG. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit applied Tay-
lor's definition. The Ninth Circuit's reasoning reversed the enhanced
sentence of the defendant under the USSG, finding that Washington
"residential burglary" is outside the generic definition of "burglary of a
dwelling." The Tenth Circuit's analysis found that burglary of a "resi-
dential structure" under Arizona law was within the definition of "bur-
glary of dwelling" under the USSG and upheld the enhanced sentence. In
fact, all of the above cases decided by the Tenth Circuit upheld the sen-
tence enhancement imposed by the District Court, save Martinez, which
found that only part of the sentence enhancement, the enhancement un-
der the USSG, could be upheld. Thus, when one considers the Tenth
Circuit's prevalent rejection of Ninth Circuit reasoning, 334 and its recent
330. Id
331. Id. at 1195 n.5 (majority opinion).
332. Id.
333. Gonzales v. Tafoya, 515 F.3d 1097, 1117 (10th Cir. 2008).
334. See, e.g., Rivera-Oros, 590 F.3d at 1132-33 (rejecting the recent Ninth Circuit decision).
For splits between the Ninth and Tenth Circuits on other issues, see Unareroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d
1197, 1211 (10th Cir. 2006) (declining to follow the Ninth Circuit's per se rule regarding credibility
of an immigrant who has lied to gain entry into the United States to avoid persecution); Admin.
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trend upholding sentencing enhancements under the ACCA and USSG, it
is likely that the court will uphold the hypothetical use of juvenile adju-
dications as predicate offenses.
Furthermore, even if the Tenth Circuit's hypothetical analysis of
this issue favored the Tighe majority, or adopted some of the analysis in
Part II.C.23 3' below, the AEDPA means the court can only do so if the
defendant is in federal custody. If the defendant is in state custody, the
Tenth Circuit may find itself restricted by § 2254 as there is no Supreme
Court ruling on the issue of juvenile adjudications as prior convictions or
predicate offenses under the ACCA.
Nevertheless, the most concrete evidence of the Tenth Circuit's po-
sition on the issue is its 2008 decision in Gonzales v. Tafoya.16 Notably,
this decision comes after the Tighe and Smalley progeny. In Gonzales,
the court considered whether it was a violation of Apprendi to have a
judge determine that a juvenile is not amenable to treatment or eligible
for commitment to a mental health facility under New Mexico law. 3 3 7
Mr. Gonzales was a fourteen-year-old boy who accepted a plea agree-
ment to be sentenced to twenty-two years in an adult prison for the
crimes of second-degree murder, aggravated residential burglary, aggra-
vated battery with a firearm, and two counts of aggravated assault.338
New Mexico does not have any mechanism for the transfer of a juvenile
to adult criminal court; instead, all juveniles are heard in the Children's
Court, which has the ability to issue juvenile and adult sentences.339
The Children's Court, after considering many factors, can sentence
a juvenile to time in an adult facility if "(1) the child is not amenable to
treatment or rehabilitation as a child in available facilities, and [2] the
child is not eligible for commitment to an institution for the developmen-
tally disabled or mentally disordered." 3 4 0 Despite evidence of and expert
testimony regarding Mr. Gonzales's mental illness, the court, in an ame-
nability hearing, found that Mr. Gonzales was not amenable to rehabilita-
Comm. of the Wal-Mart Assocs. Health & Welfare Plan v. Willard, 393 F.3d 1119, 1125 (10th Cir.
2004) (declining to follow "the Ninth Circuit's highly restrictive view of the scope of 'appropriate
and equitable relief"); Yerkovich v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 990, 994-95 (10th Cir. 2004) (acknowledg-
ing the Ninth Circuit's differing view concerning a federal statute barring judicial review of an
immigration judge's discretionary decision, but declining to follow it); United States v. James, 257
F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2001) (declining to use the Ninth Circuit's approach to review selective
prosecution discovery orders with an abuse of discretion standard, and instead holding that such
orders should be reviewed de novo); United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 2001)
(agreeing with the reasoning of the Eighth, Eleventh, Fifth, Seventh, First, and Fourth circuits and
declining to adopt the position of the Ninth Circuit concerning whether application of certain sen-
tencing guidelines violates the ex post facto clause); United States v. La. Pac. Corp., 106 F.3d 345,
348 (10th Cir. 1997) (declining to adopt the Ninth Circuit's discrete basis test).
335. See discussion infra Part ll.C.3.
336. 515 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2008).
337. Id. at 1104.
338. Id.at1104,1106.
339. Id. at 1103.
340. Id. at 1104 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-20(B) (2010)).
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tion and not eligible for commitment in an institution for the develop-
mentally disabled.3 4 1 The defendant appealed this decision, arguing that
it was a violation of his due process rights under Apprendi to have the
amenability findings made by a judge and not a jury.342 The New Mexico
Court of Appeals upheld the adult sentence and the defendant submitted
a habeas corpus petition to the federal district court.34 3 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of the habeas peti-
344tion.
The Tenth Circuit held that the facts leading to Mr. Gonzales's adult
sentence were not "fact[s] that increase[d] the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum" under Apprendi.345 Instead, the court
reasoned that the factors the judge had to weigh were not questions of
historical fact, as in Apprendi, but value judgments as to the juvenile's
amenability to rehabilitation and eligibility for treatment. 346 The Tenth
Circuit held that value judgments are typically in the purview of judicial
discretion and thus, a defendant's right to a jury is never implicated.347
Although the Tenth Circuit recognized that many of the factors to be
weighed by the judge are questions of historical fact, the court found that
these factors were not at issue in the case because of Mr. Gonzales's plea
agreement.3 48
The court also applied the Smalley holding that juvenile proceedings
do not require the procedural protection of a jury trial. 349 The Gonzales
court cites Supreme Court precedent regarding the due process protec-
tions afforded to juveniles in the juvenile court system to show that a
jury is not required for juvenile transfer proceedings;3so the juvenile is
merely entitled to a hearing, a statement of the reasons for the decision to
transfer, and assistance of counsel.35 ' Therefore, the court concludes that
because the factors determining Mr. Gonzales's adult sentence and lack
of amenability are value judgments-not issues of historical fact-and
juveniles are not constitutionally entitled to jury findings, Apprendi does
not apply because it dealt with the determination of historical facts and
341. Gonzales, 515 F.3d at 1107.
342. Id. at 1108.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 1101 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000)).
346. Gonzales, 515 F.3d at 1113-14.
347. Id. at 1114. Legal scholars have called the distinction between value judgments and his-
torical fact into question. See Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, The Facts About Ring v. Arizona and
the Jury's Role in Capital Sentencing 40-41 (Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law Legal Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-11, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1564465.
348. Gonzales, 515 F.3d at 1114.
349. Id at 1114-15.
350. Id. (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545-51 (1971) (plurality opinion); In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-57 (1967); Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 554-565 (1966)).
351. Gonzales, 515 F.3d at 1115.
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adult sentences.35 2 The Tenth Circuit held that the refusal of the New
Mexico Court of Appeals to apply Apprendi to juvenile transfer proceed-
ings was not contrary to established federal law. 35 3
Because of the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the applicability of
Apprendi to juvenile situations, there is little reason to believe that the
Tenth Circuit will find that juvenile adjudications are not predicate of-
fenses for sentencing enhancements because of their lack of a jury trial.
Similar to the issue in Tighe and its progeny, transfer of a juvenile to
adult court (or sentencing a juvenile to adult imprisonment) increases the
maximum sentence the defendant will endure. The Tenth Circuit has
already shown its support for the argument that juvenile adjudications do
not constitutionally require trial-by-jury. Nonetheless, the court based its
decision on the lack of historical facts found in the amenability hearing
and not the lack of a jury trial right in juvenile proceedings. Thus, there
is still hope that the Tenth Circuit will question Supreme Court precedent
from the 1970s because the court's dicta leaves the question open of the
importance of the lack of a jury trial right in juvenile proceedings: "[T]he
mere fact that juveniles may not have a federal constitutional right to a
jury trial in delinquency proceedings does not seem sufficient to distin-
guish Apprendi when the findings at issue authorize an adult sen-
tence."354
Furthermore, the court seems to ignore the issue of a "constitutional
no man's land" in which a juvenile can be denied the benefits of a juve-
nile justice system and the protections of the adult criminal system.355
After mentioning this troublesome quandary, the Tenth Circuit distin-
guished Apprendi by stating: "Nevertheless, in our view, the distinction
between the kinds of findings made at the amenability hearing and find-
ings traditionally made by juries is a plausible one."356 The lack of con-
cern for the constitutional no man's land creates little optimism that the
Tenth Circuit would be the first court to examine the policies and prac-
tices of the juvenile justice system and what they mean regarding the
reliability of a juvenile adjudication and its qualification as a prior con-
viction for ACCA purposes.
2. Juvenile Adjudications Should Not Constitute a Prior Conviction
under the Apprendi Exception
When taken at face value, the arguments made in both the Tighe
majority and dissent each have merit and are each based on strong textual
interpretations of Supreme Court precedent. The argument seems to
largely depend on one's view of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
352. Id.atlIl5,1117.
353. Id. at 117.
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trial and the rights afforded to juveniles during adjudications. Unfortu-
nately, it is in this arena that both the majorities and the dissents fail to
fully extrapolate the issues. Thorough analysis of the juvenile court sys-
tem is conspicuously absent from the Tighe and Smalley progeny. If the
courts engaged in such a discussion, the conclusion that juvenile adjudi-
cations do not meet the Apprendi exception would become obvious sim-
ply because they cannot be considered prior convictions.
Juvenile adjudications are not on par with criminal convictions for
myriad reasons. This section presents a combined due process and social
justice argument for prohibiting juvenile adjudications from constituting
prior convictions and predicate offenses under the ACCA. This argument
is largely built on the missing analyses in the Tighe and Smalley progeny:
a philosophical and empirical discussion of the differences between ju-
venile and adult court, and consideration of the rights afforded to juve-
niles in adjudications versus the "realities" or practices of juvenile court.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated in recent decisions that it
considers the neurological evidence of juvenile immaturity, underdevel-
oped sense of responsibility, and poor impulse control as important evi-
dence for tempering the sentences given to juveniles, even those sen-
tenced as adult offenders.357
a. The Realities of Juvenile Court
The only "realities" of the juvenile court that the opinions discuss
are the supposed reliability of adjudications.35 8 Each opinion notes that
there are differences between juvenile and criminal courts, but none
delve into the philosophy behind those differences or empirical evidence
of what the differences actually mean. These courts argue that juveniles
are essentially afforded all the due process rights as adults except for the
right to a jury trial, which would not enhance the fact-finding function of
the court. 359 A judge must still find that the juvenile is delinquent beyond
a reasonable doubt.360 No court, however, addresses what a bench adju-
dication means to a juvenile.
In 1971, the Supreme Court was optimistic regarding the reliability
of judicial fact-finding, 3 6 1 but since that time, studies have been pub-
lished showing that judges are more likely than juries to develop biases
favoring police. 36 2 Studies have also shown that the unique discussion
format of jury deliberations enhances reliability, and the diversity of ex-
357. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-
71 (2005).
358. See United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007); Jones II, 332 F.3d 688,
696 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir 2002).
359. See Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1033.
360. Id.
361. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971) (plurality opinion).
362. Recent Case, 116 HARV. L. REV. 705, 709 (2002).
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periences among a twelve-person jury "increases the fairness of its
evaluations as compared to those of a single judge."363
Furthermore, seven years after McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,364 the
Court recognized empirical evidence-in a plurality opinion authored by
the same Justice as the McKeiver opinion-that larger groups of fact-
finders are more reliable than smaller ones.365 In juvenile adjudications,
the factfinding body is reduced to one, the judge. Moreover, the plurality
in McKeiver noted that "[t]oo often the juvenile court judge falls far short
of that stalwart, protective, and communicating figure the system envis-
aged."366 Thus, the reliance on McKeiver by Smalley and subsequent
courts is flawed as it fails to consider the true realities of the juvenile
justice system.
In addition to the judicial factfinder issue, the courts do not take into
account the considerable evidence that procedural guarantees, although
mandated, are not applied with any regularity.367 Juvenile courts were
created at the turn of the twentieth century with a focus on rehabilitation
and informality in a non-criminal context.368 However, the line between
juvenile and criminal court has become exceedingly gray within the last
three decades; juveniles can now be sentenced to a mix of juvenile incar-
ceration and adult imprisonment, juveniles can be charged as adults,
avoiding the juvenile justice system altogether, and as the cases above
demonstrate, juvenile adjudications now have serious consequences in
adulthood.3 69 Furthermore, because of the false perception of juvenile
courts as lenient entities, juveniles may not dispute a particular accusa-
tion because of a lenient judge, inadequate counsel, or because his family
thinks treatment-otherwise unaffordable or unattainable-may help the
child.370 Thus, the informal system that promotes discretionary sentenc-
ing and creates an atmosphere of factual and procedural laxness, which
results in facts that can rarely be classified as undisputed, is the same
system that may ultimately lead to a person's sentence of a minimum of
fifteen years, or in California's case, an indeterminate life sentence. 371
363. Id. (citing Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice:
Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 553, 575-79
(1998)).
364. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
365. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-39 (1978) (plurality opinion) (holding that five
jurors is too few); see also Recent Case, supra note 361, at 709.
366. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 544.
367. See Richard E. Redding, Using Juvenile Adjudications for Sentence Enhancement Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is it Sound Policy?, 10 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 231, 243-51
(2002) (discussing the lack of full due process and lack of or poor representation accorded to juve-
niles during adjudication).
368. See Jason Abbott, The Use of Juvenile Adjudications Under the Armed Career Criminal
Act, 85 B.U. L. REV. 263, 265 (2005); Redding, supra note 366, at 231.
369. Redding, supra note 366, at 231-32.
370. See Abbott, supra note 367, at 279.
371. See id
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Juvenile adjudications are unreliable not only because of question-
able factfinding, but also because of the patchwork of due process rights
actually afforded in adjudications, including the inconsistent right to ef-
fective counsel at adjudication proceedings. Because of the original goals
behind juvenile adjudications, such as individualized and rehabilitative
dispositions, in practice, the procedural requirements mandated by the
Supreme Court372 are frequently relaxed; juvenile courts often follow
evidentiary and procedural rules less rigorously and are characterized by
more frequent procedural errors.373 Furthermore, a study in 1989 that
interviewed 100 juvenile court workers found that one-fourth of the re-
spondents felt that juveniles did not receive a fair trial, judges often ad-
mitted clearly inadmissible evidence and failed to consider defense mo-
tions, and would often enter an adjudication of delinquency with insuffi-
cient evidence of guilt.374
The underlying philosophy of juvenile court also leads to unpredict-
able results between the states and even within a state. This "justice by
geography" is the result of juvenile court emphasis on individual consid-
eration of the juvenile's particular situation and, often, their need for
treatment and mental health services that are otherwise not available. 375
Thus, if a judge wants to get a juvenile into treatment-as per the phi-
losophy of the juvenile justice system-they may declare them delin-
376quent based on insufficient evidence. But that adjudication can come
back to haunt the adult when he or she is given an increased sentenced
based on "career criminality." The Bureau of Justice Statistics has con-
cluded that sentencing laws that count juvenile adjudications as predicate
offenses "assume that there is some substantive meaning to a juvenile
adjudication for a particular offense . . . . Because the juvenile justice
system is often treatment-oriented, there is no necessary relationship
between the adjudicated offense and the 'sentence' imposed by the
court."377
372. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547, 550 (1971) (plurality opinion); In re Win-
ship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31(1967).
373. Redding, supra note 366, at 243; see generally Caterina Ditraglia, "The Worst of Both
Worlds": Defending Children in Juvenile Court, 63 Mo. L. REV. 477 (1988) (arguing that juvenile
courts provide a procedural matrix under which few adults would consent to be tried because of the
less rigorous adherence to procedural rules, frequent procedural errors, and the less adversarial
setting).
374. See Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Remnants ofParens Patriae in the Adjudicatory Hearing: Is a
Fair Trial Possible in Juvenile Court?, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 599, 603-04 (1994).
375. Redding, supra note 366, at 244.
376. See id at 244-45. On December 10, 2010, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Tapia
v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 817 (2010), a Ninth Circuit case that considers whether a federal judge
can give a convicted defendant a longer sentence in order to give the defendant access to drug treat-
ment.
377. Neal Miller, National Assessment of Criminal Court Use of Defendants' Juvenile Adjudi-
cation Records, in BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE RECORDS: APPROPRIATE CRIMINAL AND NONCRIMINAL JUSTICE
USES 27, 29 (1997), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/NCJJR.PDF.
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Another assumption that the court made in Smalley-and subse-
quent courts continue to make-is that juveniles are actually meaning-
fully provided with an attorney.378 This is not a reality. Many juveniles
waive their right to an attorney, but there is strong evidence that such
waivers are not made "voluntarily, knowingly, or intelligently." 7 An
ABA study found that 46% of public defenders say a colloquy is given
only "sometimes" or "rarely" and 45% responded that when the colloquy
is given, it is only "sometimes" or "rarely" as thorough as one given to
adult defendants.3o Furthermore, the waivers "are sometimes induced by
suggestions that lawyers are not needed because no serious dispositional
consequences are anticipated . . . . These circumstances raise the possi-
bility-perhaps the likelihood-that a substantial number of juvenile
waivers are not 'knowing and intelligent." 381 The thought that serious
dispositional consequences are not possible is patently false with the
advent of the ACCA. Additionally, studies conducted in the 1980s show
that juveniles often fail to understand or appreciate their rights, including
their right to counsel.382
Assuming juveniles do not waive their right and are provided with
counsel, there is also the concern of effective representation. Juveniles
appearing for adjudication hearings are often represented by public de-
fenders who have no training in juvenile law, deal with heavy caseloads,
and who are criticized for zealous representation. 383 Moreover, there is an
extremely low professional status associated with juvenile law that is part
of the systemic problem of poor representation at juvenile adjudica-
tions.384 The same ABA study indicated that:
In some courts, attorneys are subtly reminded by the court, the prose-
cutor, and other court personnel that zealous advocacy is considered
inappropriate and counter-productive. Lawyers who refuse to temper
their advocacy . . . may suffer from subtle disapproval or . . . fee re-
ductions or being excluded from the panel of court-appointed attor-
385
neys.
In failing utterly to consider the actual realities of the juvenile jus-
tice system, Smalley and its progeny committed a disservice to juveniles
across the United States. The message is one of hypocrisy. As a govern-
378. See Redding, supra note 366, at 247 ("Representation rates vary widely within and across
states, but in many jurisdictions it is less than 50%, with first-time offenders having the lowest
representation rates." (footnote omitted)).
379. Id; see also AM. BAR ASS'N, A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO
COUNSEL & QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 7 (1995), available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/cfifull.pdf [hereinafter ABA].
380. ABA, supra note 378, at 7.
381. Id. at 7-8.
382. Redding, supra note 366, at 248.
383. Id. at 250-51.
384. Id. at 250.
385. ABA, supra note 378, at 27.
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ment and as a court system we proclaim juveniles are the future leaders
of America, who are resilient, amenable to rehabilitation and worth pro-
tecting; yet, juvenile offenses, which are characterized by the informality
and rehabilitative emphasis of the juvenile court, are historical factors
leading to the prolonged imprisonment of the adult juvenile offender. 38 6
387b. Neuroscience of the Juvenile: Roper v. Simmons & Gra-
ham v. Florida388
Recently, the Supreme Court has addressed juvenile sentencing and
has categorically prohibited sentencing a juvenile to death or life without
the "realistic opportunity" of parole for a non-homicide crime.' 89 In the
analyses, both opinions refer to the lack of maturity and underdeveloped
sense of responsibility of defendants under eighteen and their resulting
lesser culpability and greater susceptibility to change. 39 0 Both opinions
also found it telling that it is difficult for psychologists to differentiate
between an impulsive youthful offender and a habitual criminal. 391 Roper
recognizes that mental health professionals are not allowed to diagnose a
person under eighteen as having antisocial personality disorder (i.e., psy-
chopathy or sociopathy) because of their developing personalities.39 2
Similarly, Graham argues that psychology and brain science continue to
show that parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to ma-
ture through late adolescence.39 3
These conclusions concerning the developing personality of the ju-
venile and their diminished culpability serve the argument that adjudica-
tions should not be treated as predicate offenses for state or federal sen-
tencing enhancements. If the juvenile is not as culpable when he or she is
judged to be delinquent by the court, how can such offenses be deemed
violent felonies or crimes of violence on par with adult convictions? The
Supreme Court relies on evidence that the juvenile's brain is not fully
formed in the area of decision-making and impulse control and thus, their
adjudications do not have the equivalent mens rea of adult convictions. 394
In Begay v. United States, the Court recognized the importance of mens
rea in finding a "violent felony" under the ACCA and concluded that a
DUI is not a violent felony because the offense is one of strict liability. 3 95
386. See generally Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 771 (2010) (argu-
ing that the widespread nature of ineffective representation in juvenile adjudications and the serious
future consequences of adjudications necessitates a fom of legal redress for those harmed by sub-
standard legal representation in juvenile proceedings).
387. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
388. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
389. Id. at 2033-34.
390. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-71.
391. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026; Roper, 543 U.S. at 573-74.
392. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573.
393. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
394. See id. at 2026-27.
395. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146-48 (2008).
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While juvenile offenses do not completely lack a mens rea requirement,
the scientific evidence used by the Supreme Court indicates that juve-
niles do not commit offenses with the same "guilty mind"396 as an adult
offender.
However, the applicability of the neurological evidence used in
Roper and Graham should not be assumed. Both courts made their hold-
ings narrow and confined their decisions to sentences that effectively
ended the juvenile's life. 3 9 7 The issue of juvenile adjudications as predi-
cate offenses is not always as severe. While an offender could face a very
tough sentencing enhancement that results in an indeterminate life sen-
tence (i.e., a Three-Strikes law), others may be sentenced to the mini-
mum under the ACCA, fifteen years. Thus the Supreme Court may see
an enhanced sentence as a way to give the defendant "separat[ion] from
society for some time in order to prevent . . . an escalating pattern of
criminal conduct . . . ."398 But, the appeal to the Supreme Court would
not likely proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim, which makes the
length and proportionality of the sentence relevant; the claim is likely to
proceed under a Fourteenth Amendment violation of due process and
thus, the neurological evidence may be used in a new and unique man-
ner.
The Tighe dissent and the Smalley progeny rely in large part on the
similar reliability of a juvenile adjudication to the adult criminal convic-
tion and the "sufficient" due process rights afforded to juveniles that
secures this reliability. However, as the above studies and literature
show, the reliability of adjudications and protection from due process
procedures are highly questionable. Sentences may be imposed in order
to place the juvenile in treatment as opposed to the offense having been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt; a single fact-finder is less reliable
than a jury; colloquies regarding a juvenile's right to counsel are sub-
standard and juvenile waivers may often not be "knowing or intelligent;"
when counsel is present in adjudication proceedings, bars to effective
counsel abound; etc. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated that
juveniles are less culpable than adult defendants. It follows that a less
culpable defendant should not later be punished for what the Supreme
Court has characterized as impulsive actions.
Thus, a juvenile adjudication cannot be considered on par with the
reliability of an adult conviction because the due process rights mandated
in juvenile proceedings are not "more than sufficient" to ensure that reli-
ability. The lack of a right to a jury trial emphasized in Apprendi is just
one of the issues with juvenile adjudications that should legally preclude
396. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1075 (9th ed. 2009).
397. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034; Roper, 543 U.S. at 574-75.
398. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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an adjudication from constituting a prior conviction and predicate of-
fense under Apprendi and the ACCA.
3. Will the Supreme Court Ever Weigh-In?
As some of the cases above have noted, the Supreme Court has de-
nied multiple opportunities to hear this issue. And, traditionally, the
Court is reluctant to hear issues on juvenile matters, reasoning that these
issues are better left to the police powers of the states. Indeed, juvenile
law rarely becomes a federal issue because juveniles are considered part
of family law, an issue reserved to the powers of the states. Each of these
factors points to the continued silence from the Supreme Court. Nonethe-
less, there are several factors that might give the Supreme Court the im-
petus to grant certiorari: there is a circuit split; the Supreme Court has
recently taken on several issues concerning the application of the
ACCA 399 and sentencing of juveniles; 400 and at least one court has based
its decision on the fact that there is no clearly established federal law.401
Furthermore, after forty years,402 the Supreme Court may feel that it is
time to reevaluate the processes and practices of the juvenile court and
the necessary procedural protections.
CONCLUSION
In just one year of litigation, a single federal circuit issued six opin-
ions regarding the interpretation of the ACCA or USSG and created two
circuit splits. The Supreme Court has noted that the resolution of these
splits and others like them "could occupy the Court for years."403 And
while the Tenth Circuit seems to conduct a more thorough analysis of the
burglary and eluding cases because of their adherence to Taylor's generic
definition methodology and consistent use of the modified categorical
approach, the Tenth Circuit has yet to address the issue of juvenile adju-
dications.
The reluctance of the Supreme Court to address the issue of juvenile
adjudications as predicate offenses will most certainly have to end in the
near future, but at what costs? Will the Court redefine the juvenile court?
Will the goals of the juvenile system be eradicated? Will the reliability
399. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1268 (2010) (deciding whether the Florida
statutory crime of battery constitutes a "violent felony" under the ACCA); Chambers v. United
States, 555 U.S. 122, 129 (2009) (deciding whether failure to report to prison constitutes a "violcnt
felony" under the ACCA); Begay, 553 U.S. at 139 (deciding whether DUI is a "violent felony"
under the ACCA); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 198 (2007) (finding that attempt crimes
may qualify as predicate offenses under the ACCA when they involve conduct that presents a seri-
ous potential risk to another).
400. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2017-18; Roper, 543 U.S. at 555-56.
401. Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1152 (9th Cir. 2006).
402. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). Winship is a decision in the middle of a line of
Supreme Court cases that mandated the due process rights to be afforded to juveniles in the adjudica-
tion process. It was decided in 1970, predating McKeiver and following In re Gault.
403. Chambers, 555 U.S. at 122 (Alito, J., concurring).
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and due process protection of juvenile adjudications be examined? Or,
will the Court simply decide that, contrary to their previous decisions,
the ACCA is too vague to continue and thereby force Congress to reform
its Act for the first time since 1986. Regardless, as the survey above
shows, the ACCA and USSG recidivist sections have created substantial
litigation and resulted in many a judicial quandary and disagreement.
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